861.01/2232: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

1369. A ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, dated July 16th, published in today’s Moscow newspapers, establishes the institution of military commissars “in all regiments and divisions, staff units, military academies and institutions of the Red army at both the front and the rear.”77 The ukase is fairly extensive and a considerable portion of it is devoted to the obligation of a military commissar to report regarding commanders and political workers who are unworthy of their offices to set a personal example of bravery and courage, to instill in the soldiers bravery, daring and scorn of death, to conduct a merciless struggle with cowards, creators of panic and deserters and to implanting with firm hand revolutionary order and discipline. It concludes by stating that all orders of a regiment, division, administration or institution are to be signed by the commander and the military commissar.

Although it is difficult to obtain adequate information regarding the reasons for and reactions to orders of this nature, I feel warranted in saying that the reinstitution of the Commissar system which was abolished only last year78 and the repeated references in the ukase to bravery, courage, daring and scorn of death must be construed to imply [Page 631] a considerable deterioration of morale in the Red army and an emergency effort to correct the situation.

It is possibly significant that, contrary to the habitual practice of the major Moscow newspapers, no editorial comment appears with the ukase.

It has been suggested that the issuance of this ukase may be regarded as the second of two major indications of difficulties in the Red army command. The first of these in retrospect may have been the recent designation of Voroshilov,79 Timoshenko and Budenny80 as field commanders—especial importance in this respect being attached to the virtual demotion of Timoshenko from the General High Command to a command on one of the fronts, and the additional fact that both Budenny and Voroshilov are regarded more as politicians than prepared military leaders. Major Yeaton81 reports that it is believed by most of his military associates that the Soviet High Command as at present constituted probably consists of Stalin, Shaposhnikov82 and Kulik,83 the latter two being Marshals.

Steinhardt
  1. Ambassador Steinhardt reported in telegram No. 1409, July 25, 1941, that the military commissars had also been reinstituted in the Navy (740.0011 European War 1939/13483).
  2. See the Ambassador’s telegram No. 1011, August 13, 1940, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iii, p. 211. See also Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, p. 519, footnote 13.
  3. Marshal Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, a Vice President of the Council of People’s Commissars, formerly People’s Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union until May 7, 1940.
  4. Marshal Semën Mikhailovich Budenny, First Assistant People’s Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union after August 16, 1940.
  5. Ivan D. Yeaton, American Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.
  6. Marshal Boris Mikhailovich Shaposknikov, Assistant People’s Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union after August 16, 1940; previously Chief of the General Staff of the Red army.
  7. Grigory Ivanovich Kulik, a Marshal of the Soviet Union since May 7, 1940.