740.0011 European War 1939/12816: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

266. I spoke to President Ryti this afternoon in sense of your No. 128, July 2 and left with him memorandum embodying substance of second and third paragraphs thereof as well as copy of Acting Secretary’s statement of June 23 previously received in Department’s telegram 112,7 but I have not received and therefore could not give the President substance of President Roosevelt’s statements mentioned as being transmitted in Department’s No. 149.8

President Ryti said that position of Finland in present hostilities against U. S. S. R. was that of a co-belligerent with Germans and he expressly denied that Finland is allied with Germany. He asked me at conclusion of conversation to formulate his remarks which I did in his outer office giving him copy. This formulation which he discussed with Prime Minister and approved before I left the palace will follow in my telegram No. 267 today.9

The President said that Russians had built five separate level highways to Finnish border at various points from vicinity of Petsamo nickel mine through Salla area as far south as Suolahti and that Finns had been puzzled as to why these roads were constructed on a level rather than following topographical contours. It now appears roads were built with idea of facilitating construction of light field railroads which had been done in some cases. Until today when big offensive in Salla sector and in northern Ladoga sector began Finnish troops had been engaged only in patrol activities and Russian reports to contrary were untrue just as Russian report was untrue that there had been attempted German landing in Viborg Bay. Direct assault on Viborg area would be extremely costly and was not contemplated for the present. Similar considerations apply in Hango area. Salla offensive, he said, involves Finnish columns moving south and north against Russian communications while Germans are taking offensive in center from the west.

The President spoke with bitterness of Britain restrictions on food imports into Finland which he said had done more to alienate Finnish opinion from Britain than any action taken by Germans. He did not seem to include United States in this feeling and indeed expressed appreciation of understanding shown for Finland in the United States and by myself. Answering my direct question whether there [Page 47] were any political agreements with German Government, President answered in negative saying he had some fear at one time that Finland might be asked to join Three Power Pact but Germans had not made this request or indeed any other requests of political nature except very unwelcome demand for termination of Polish and Norwegian Legations here, latter of which requests had been flatly refused on ground of northern solidarity.

The President told me in confidence that while German Government had been strictly correct in its relations with Finnish Government, thus far he felt some anxiety lest Nazi Party activities should be intensified here, implying that they might meet with some success in certain social strata. I may mention that Tanner’s return to Cabinet10 and his statement summarized in my No. 264 today11 indicate awareness of this possibility and are probably designed to forestall any such development which would, of course, greatly weaken Social Democratic Party and other liberal elements here.

President intimated that with fall of Leningrad, of which he was confident, in relatively short time Finnish aim would be to recover lost Karelian territory but he was personally inclined to favor drawing boundary somewhat further to west than before the war of 39–40 on ground that there was merit in claim that power controlling Leningrad should be in position to give that city adequate protection. The President made no allusion to possible frontier rectifications further north including Salla area where offensive began today.

President repeatedly assured me that Finnish Government contemplates only Finnish aims in present hostilities and had no intention of lending itself to any German purposes except as co-belligerent with Germany against U. S. S. R. He seemed to have no anxiety that such policy would continue to be possible though he would venture no prediction beyond expressing hope that this time Bolshevik regime would be crushed to great advantage of world and especially of Finland. I gathered that President believes in early German victory in the East and is not at all convinced that Germany will lose western war but that he proposes to make every effort to prevent identification of Finland with German cause outside scope of hostilities against U. S. S. R.

President was calm and clear in all his statements, alluding again to fact that he has given much thought to peace settlement following general war. Saying that Finland could not hope to influence this settlement decisively, he hoped that responsible statesmen among great powers would avoid mistakes of past 20 years and make sure in interest of small powers as well as large that settlement would not sow seeds of new war within a generation. Intimating that he was [Page 48] not confident German statesmen would be equal to this task if Germany should win the war, he was somewhat less doubtful that British statesmanship would be equal to it in the opposite event and hoped American statesmanship would insure stable settlement.

Schoenfeld
  1. Telegram not printed; but see telegram No. 836, June 23, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 767.↩
  2. This reference is to radio bulletin No. 149, June 24, 1941; see the last paragraph of the preceding telegram.↩
  3. Infra.↩
  4. Väinö A. Tanner had become Minister of Commerce and Industry.↩
  5. Not printed.↩