740.0011 European War 1939/19031
The Minister to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
Sir: I have the honor to report that a leading official of the Yugoslav Government confidentially disclosed to me that in a late November conversation with another member of the Yugoslav Government, Russian Ambassador Maisky had pointedly remarked it was not unlikely that, at the termination of hostilities, Russia might consider that her economic frontiers extended to the Danube, and possibly to the Adriatic.
Maisky had gone on to say he envisaged the formation of several main federations and sub-federations somewhat along the following lines as a practical post-war set-up in Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans:
- 1.
- One main federation formed around Yugoslavia; this to include several sub-federations; one to include the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, [Page 338] Macedonians; another to include Bulgaria and Albania, Roumania and Greece.
- 2.
- Another main federation to consist of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
- 3.
- Still another federation to consist of the Baltic States.
Once these countries were grouped somewhat along the above lines, Ambassador Maisky had significantly added, he would be inclined to look for them to lean economically and militarily on Russia.
In mid-December, my informant went on to say, another of his associates in the Yugoslav Government had had a conversation with Ambassador Bogomolov, the Russian representative to the Allied Governments established in London. When the Yugoslav-Greek negotiations for post-war federation were mentioned in the course of discussion, Bogomolov greeted this subject with pointed coldness. He had thereupon proceeded to review economic conditions which had existed in the Balkans during the years which had led up to the outbreak of the present war, emphasizing that the Balkans had undoubtedly learned by this experience that they could not look to Western Europe for economic cooperation on anywhere near the scale required. Why, then, in terms of the future outlook, did the Balkans not turn their minds to the study of possibilities which lay in economic cooperation with Russia? Indeed, when the war ended it would undoubtedly be to Russia to whom the Balkans, in fact all of Central and Eastern Europe, would look as a source of raw materials, machinery and other material assistance. Moreover, Bogomolov had continued, he thought that in endeavoring to solve Yugoslavia’s internal economic problems, the Yugoslav Government would do well to profit by Russia’s experience. After all Yugoslavia, like Russia, had a large peasant population involving problems similar to those for which Russia had already found a solution.
Commenting on the foregoing, my informant, one of the leading members of the Croat element in the Yugoslav Government, stated that the remarks both of Maisky and of Bogomolov were a matter of deep concern for his Government. His associates and he had construed them to mean that the recent successes of the Russian counter offensive had already stimulated Russia’s post-war aspirations on the continent.
As concerned Yugoslavia as a whole, my informant continued, it had historically looked to Imperial Russia as a sort of “mother protector” in moments of grave crises. In the course of post Great-War years communist activities had succeeded in penetrating Serbia. Communism had gotten a hold on many of the people in that part of the country. Consequently, in Serbia one found today that a surprisingly large proportion of the people, and even a considerable proportion of the Orthodox clergy, in continuing to look to Russia as their “mother [Page 339] protector”, were consciously looking to Communist Russia. On the other hand, territories bordering the Adriatic, and particularly Croatia, had been far less affected by Communist influences. Therefore, he said, the Croatians, as a whole, were conscious of the difference between the Russia of yesterday and the Russia of the Comintern.
In concluding his remarks, my informant said that while his Serb associates refrained from discussing the matter “outside”, they were well aware of the reportedly growing communist influence on the Serbs, and shared their Croat associates’ concern as to the potential bearing thereof upon future Yugoslavia.
Respectfully yours,