740.0011 European War 1939/12715: Telegram
The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 2—11:08 a.m.]
598. 1. Coincident with the forced retirement of the Russian troops in the north which is momentarily expected here I am reliably informed that the Germano-Rumanian armies on the southern front will launch an all-out attack.
I am satisfied that when General Antonescu last saw Hitler less than 3 weeks ago the latter held out hope of the reincorporation of Rumanian ethnic elements beyond the Dniester. After sending my telegram No. 565 of June 21, 5 p.m.88 I have again talked with Maniu89 who is strongly opposed to any advance of the Rumanian Army beyond the [Page 320] Dniester. He has urged the General to be satisfied with the return of northern Bukowina and Bessarabia, neither of which is however absolutely certain inasmuch as Hitler apparently plans to create a German controlled Ukrainian state. Furthermore Maniu still fears a trap for the Rumanian Army—as I and many thinking Rumanians do—which might result in its decimation. Having in mind the possibility of treachery towards the Rumanian Army and the desirability of preserving its mobility he has protested strongly against the wholesale incorporation of large Rumanian contingents with the German forces feeling also that the Rumanian Army should fight separately as an independent [apparent omissions].
I also discussed with Maniu the possibility that Hungary might try to steal a further march on Rumania should both the German and Rumanian Armies become involved in a far distant campaign and he seemed fully aware of this contingency.
2. I learn from an absolutely reliable source that when General Antonescu brought up the question of who should be Commander-in-Chief of the combined German and Rumanian Armies, Hitler paid him the compliment of saying he wanted him to take the command. Hitler, however, significantly declines to discuss Rumanian claims to a readjustment in Transylvania, adding that all these frontiers should be considered temporary and subject to final settlement later.
3. In spite of the fact that Maniu and other competent observers continue to give credence, though in diminishing measure, I am more than ever skeptical of the alleged “negotiations[”] between Germany and Russia frequently commented upon in my telegrams to you. I do believe, however, that the conditions I reported or similar ones may have been voiced by German officials as trial balloons with subordinate Russian officials in Germany working on Danubian and economic questions, just to see what response, if any, would be made. Failing total acceptance Germany had decided to attack. The decision was inescapable for the reasons pointed out inter alia in my 114 of February 6, 5 p.m.90
Nothing short of complete surrender—economic, military and ideologic—would have averted war. Moreover I have since learned indirectly from the German Minister’s frequent host for bear hunting that almost a month ago von Kilxinger [Killinger] said to him that in 3 weeks’ time Germany would in any case attack Russia no matter what happened. Female and some of the male members of the Italian Mission began leaving town for the mountains as long ago as 3 weeks and many of the members of the German Legation and their families had already pretty well installed themselves at Snagov well outside Bucharest a week before the war broke out. In Rumanian official [Page 321] circles here the attack was expected on the previous Monday or Tuesday. I have since learned that it was only deferred due to the delay in the final disposition of what was considered a sufficiency of planes. Very heavy and persistent rains also as previously reported were a temporary deterrent.