Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, Volume I

740.0011 European War 1939/14106

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in Turkey (Kelley)⁸¹

Ankara, June 16, 1941.

Participants:	Dr. Milan Gavrilović, former Yugoslav Minister to Moscow;
	Dr. Iliya Choumenkovitch, Yugoslav Ambassador to Ankara;
	Mr. Michel Sokolnicki, Polish Ambassador;
	The Honorable J. V. A. MacMurray, American Ambassador; and
	Mr. Robert F. Kelley, First Secretary of Embassy.

In the course of a discussion concerning Soviet foreign policy which took place after a dinner at the Yugoslav Embassy in honor of Dr. Gavrilović, former Yugoslav Minister to Moscow, the latter expanded and supplemented the views which he had expressed in his conversation with Mr. Kelley on June 15. Upon being asked what had led the Soviet Government to manifest an anti-Nazi attitude in connection with the political developments in the Balkans in the first part of the past year, he stated that the anti-Soviet activities which had been carried on secretly by Germany for a considerable time previously in Finland, the Baltic States and the Ukraine had aroused increasing concern in Moscow and, taken in conjunction with the plans of Germany to bring the Balkans under its control, had decided the Soviet Government “to come out of its shell,” as Dr. Gavrilović put it, and endeavor to impede German expansion. He said that the Soviet Government was striving by this policy (in this connection he referred to his conversation with Stalin) to gain further time for preparation for the coming struggle with Germany, which Soviet leaders regarded as inevitable. The Soviet Government endeavored to impede German action in the Balkans by its assurance to Turkey, by its statements relative to Hungary and Bulgaria, and by the signature of the Non-Aggression Pact with Yugoslavia. To be sure, the action taken by the Soviet Government was not very strong action, but it was most significant in that for the first time the Soviet Government had assumed publicly an anti-Nazi attitude. The significance of these several incidents was not lost upon the German Government. The Soviet leaders had thought that the Yugoslav resistance would keep the Germans involved in the Balkans for about three months, which would give the Soviet Union another year for its military preparations, since it would then be too late for Germany to begin this year an attack upon the Soviet Union. Mr. Gavrilović said that if Yugoslavia had succeeded in keeping the Germans occupied, as the Russians had hoped, the Russians would have “come out further from their shell”, although not to the extent of giving military assistance to Yugoslavia. Mr. Gavrilović was very insistent on this point, namely, that the Soviet Government was fully prepared to go further in manifesting its opposition to Germany’s activities in the Balkans if the Germans had encountered serious resistance in the Balkans. It would appear that his ideas in this respect are based upon his conversation with Stalin.

Upon the collapse of the Greek and Yugoslav resistance to Germany, the Soviet leaders immediately revised their policy and took steps to placate Germany. Among these steps were: the signature of the Non-Aggression Pact with Japan,⁸² the removal of Molotov from the position of Prime Minister, the expulsion of the Yugoslav Embassy from Moscow, etc. The present policy of the Soviet Government was therefore one of appeasement of Germany, and Mr. Gavrilović was certain that the Soviet Government was prepared to make substantial concessions in order to avoid war with Germany. The question of war depended wholly on Hitler, inasmuch as Germany might make demands, such as the control of Russian railways or the occupation of Ukrainian territory, which the Russians could not accept.

Mr. Gavrilović said that, in his conversation with Stalin, the latter had referred to the negotiations with the Allies prior to the signature of the Non-Aggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany.⁸³ Stalin had stated that the fact that the Allied negotiators were subordinate officials not vested with full powers, the attitude of Poland in refusing to consent to the passage of Russian troops or the flight of Russian aeroplanes over Poland, the attitude of the French Military Offices which indicated that France was planning to remain behind the Maginot Line and not undertake any offensive operations against Germany, made it clear to the Soviet Government that the conclusion of any pact with the Allies would result in the Soviet Union having to bear the full brunt of the German attack at a time when the Soviet Union was in no position to cope with a German attack.

Mr. Gavrilović said that he had noticed in recent months, particularly in military circles, a significant change of views: whereas previously there had been a certain amount of opinion favorable to an expansion of the Soviet Power in the Near East, especially in the direction of the Persian Gulf, recently this idea had been losing favor, apparently because the military authorities were opposed to embarking on adventures in that direction at a time when the German menace was steadily increasing on their Western frontiers.

He said that the Soviet leaders were very eager to see the United States engaged in the war. The flight of Hess⁸⁵ to Great Britain had caused a certain anxiety to the Soviet leaders because they interpreted it as an endeavor to bring about the conclusion of peace between England and Germany on the basis of allowing Germany a free hand against Russia. He said that Soviet officials, in conversations with him, had emphasized that after the arrival of Hess there had been no air attacks on London for a space of about three weeks, and that Mr. Churchill had declined to make any statement with regard to Hess. He was certain that if Germany attacked Russia in the near future, the Soviet leaders would be convinced that that attack had some connection with Hess’s visit to England.

Mr. Gavrilović referred again to the anti-Nazi campaign which has been carried on for some time in the Soviet Army and in the Communist Party. He said that there was very strong and widespread anti-German sentiment among the population, and that the Soviet Government was seeking to strengthen this feeling.

Mr. Gavrilović stated as a matter of interest that, at the time of the signature of the Non-Aggression Pact between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, he inquired of the Soviet authorities whether they had any objection to having the Pact signed on behalf of Yugoslavia by two Army officers in addition to the Ambassador himself. The Soviet Government raised no objection but rather welcomed the idea. He said that the Germans were particularly annoyed at this circumstance, to which they attached special significance. He added that the Germans were quite surprised by the signature of the Pact, and lodged a vigorous protest on the very same day with the Soviet authorities.

Mr. Gavrilović also stated that in the course of the interview between Prince Paul of Yugoslavia and Hitler,⁸⁶ the Führer stated that Germany was undertaking operations in the Balkans in connection with its campaign against Russia, and that as soon as the Balkan campaign was finished, he would proceed against the Soviet Union. Mr. Gavrilović stated that this was the most effective argument to use with Prince Paul on account of the latter’s hatred of the Soviet Union. When Mr. Gavrilović subsequently had occasion to tell Molotov of this conversation, the latter stated, “We are ready”.

R[obert] F. K[elley]

81. Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Turkey in his despatch No. 1741, July 10; received August 18.
82. Signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1945, p. 812.
83. A treaty of nonaggression, with secret additional protocol, was signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, p. 76.
85. Rudolf Hess, Deputy to Adolf Hitler, flew from Germany to Scotland the night of May 10–11, 1941, and was interned by the British Government.
86. Prince Paul visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden the middle of March.