740.0011 European War 1939/18567
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)
The Polish Ambassador came in to see me late this afternoon. He said that the Polish Government was much concerned regarding what may have transpired during the course of Eden’s visit to Moscow and what may be going on now as a result of that visit.37 The Polish Government was so well acquainted with Soviet mentality that it had no doubt that the Soviet Government would make use of the present world situation in order to endeavor to extract territorial and other concessions some of which, if given, would probably be at the expense of Poland. In strict confidence he said that he had no doubt regarding Eden’s integrity and his desire to do the right thing. Eden was known, however, for his impulsiveness and there was a fear that he might have given too much encouragement to Soviet territorial ambitions while he was in Moscow. He hoped that the American Government would not be swayed by arguments of immediate political expediency to sacrifice any of the principles to which it had adhered for so many years and which were in fact the principles for which most of the nations opposed to the Axis powers were fighting.
I told the Ambassador that I was not in a position to discuss with him what had transpired during the Eden visit nor what the consequences of such a visit might be. I had the feeling, however, that the Polish Government was perhaps somewhat unduly concerned.
The Ambassador said that he realized the importance of Soviet support to the Allied cause at the present time. The Polish Government for its part was doing everything which it honorably could do to improve its relations with the Soviet Union. The Polish Government, however, did not have any illusions with regard to the Soviet Government, the basic character of which was unchanged. There could be little doubt that the Soviet Government would not lose any [Page 271] opportunity which might present itself to bargain. Although cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other powers struggling against Hitler was just as advantageous to the Soviet Union as to the other powers, the Soviet Union would not hesitate to demand a price for such cooperation. In his opinion the granting of concessions involving principles at the present time would be a fatal mistake since the granting of such concessions would satisfy the Soviet Government only temporarily. It would be almost certain once it had satisfied itself of the irresoluteness of its allies to make fresh and larger demands whenever the situation in the future would present it with a favorable opportunity for so doing.
I told the Ambassador that I would pass on to my superiors in the Department the views which he had expressed.38
[For a conversation on December 29, 1941, between the Polish Ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski, and the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Loy W. Henderson, with regard to the desire of the Polish Government to participate in the formulation of the proposed joint declaration against the Axis being drafted for the signature of the Allies, see Mr. Henderson’s memorandum of this date, Foreign Relations, 1942, volume I, section entitled “Declaration by United Nations, signed January 1, 1942.”]