860C.20/96: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Polish Series [No.] 43. My 42, November 7, 9 p.m.27 Foreign Minister Raczynski tells me that on basis of assurances which Stalin recently gave Polish Ambassador Kot, General Sikorsky feels justified in continuing on to Russia.28

Kot reported: (a) with regard to release of Polish civilians Stalin said he was determined that “amnesty” should be carried out in full; (b) as regards their maintenance they could be granted no special privileges but would be given opportunity to work and conditions of work equal to those enjoyed by Russians; (c) regarding Polish military forces he was not opposed to further expansion but stressed difficulties represented by limitations on available equipment, supplies and food; (d) he was willing in principle to consider transfer of between 15 and 20,000 troops to [the Near East.]

Raczynski said that if Sikorsky’s visit were strictly limited to foregoing conditions, Stalin’s answer could not be considered satisfactory. But he felt the conversation had served to create an atmosphere which would permit the visit.

Raczynski expressed deep appreciation of American support in this matter. He was convinced he said, that the relatively favorable Russian response was due in major degree to that factor.

Winant
  1. See footnote 23, p. 262.
  2. General Sikorski left Cairo for Tehran on November 24, 1941. He reached Kuibyshev on November 30, and was due to leave for Moscow on the following day. He arrived in Cairo on his return journey on December 21, 1941. The Chargé in the Soviet Union, Walter Thurston, reported in his telegram No. 1944, November 19, 1941, that General Sikorski was expected to come to the Soviet Union. Polish Ambassador Kot had said that Stalin “in general appeared to be desirous of improving Soviet-Polish relations. In this connection Stalin remarked that it is his desire that the Polish state be reconstituted.” Stalin was agreeable “to the formation of as many as 7 Polish divisions on Soviet territory,” although these additional forces would have to be “armed, equipped and fed by Great Britain and the United States.’ (860C.20/97)