740.0011 European War 1939/16784
Copy of a Telegram Left by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) With the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) on November 10, 194122
The Polish-Soviet agreement signed between the Polish and Soviet Governments, after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, provided for the acceptance by the Soviet Government of several legitimate requests.
It was expected that the fulfillment of these requests by the Soviet Government would place the Polish-Soviet relations on a new basis, the essence of which would be a close collaboration and a mutual continuance of war against the common enemy.
In connection with bringing of this plan into effect, the Polish Prime Minister General Sikorski has planned a trip to Russia in order to discuss personally the problems involved.
In the meantime, however, a certain number of difficulties appeared in the way of technical fulfillment of their obligations by the Soviet Government.
It is to be feared that this new and regrettable development may cancel General Sikorski’s projected visit to Russia.
General Sikorski is perfectly aware of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government at the present time. Nevertheless, he feels entitled to insist that a concrete proof of good will on the part of that government be given with regard both to the Polish Army in Russia and the Polish civilian population, the situation of which is likely to get even worse, owing to the latest war developments.
A sincere manifestation of good will on the part of the Soviet Government would be at this moment a convincing proof of the possibility of a definite and durable settlement of Polish-Soviet relations.
[Page 261]As far as the Polish side is concerned, Poland accepted without hesitation full and loyal collaboration with the Soviets and in the war against Germany. The Polish Government is anxious that the Polish Army, in process of formation in Russia, should become a real asset in the struggle waged by all the Allied Powers. It appears, however, that the Soviet Government is in no position to arm, equip and even to feed the Polish forces in Russia.
On the other hand there is a possibility of obtaining the necessary military equipment, armament and food from Great Britain. In order to supply such equipment and food, the Polish Army should be placed in a locality where such supplies could reach it with the least possible delay and difficulty.
In view of the above, the Polish Government must insist that the Polish Army be moved from the territory of the Soviets to the South, namely to Iran, where its requirements [would?] be taken care of by the British authorities and where the Polish and British forces would be together.
The Polish Government cannot admit the use by the Soviet Government of Polish volunteers and soldiers, hitherto war prisoners of the Soviets, for public works, agriculture or other purposes in Russia. Such utilization of trained Polish soldiers in activities not directly connected with actual warfare is a waste and cannot be accepted by the Polish Government.
Neither is it acceptable to the Polish Government that the Soviet Government should refuse to look after the Polish civilian population, now in Russia. This population was deported from Poland at the time of the Soviet occupation of the Eastern provinces of Poland against its will and deprived of its normal conditions of existence. The Polish Government feels entitled to request that the Soviet Government give all necessary assistance and help to these deportees.
This would include not only the immediate release of all the deportees from prisons and compulsory labor camps, but also the granting of material and cultural assistance as well as of full religious freedom.
- In a conversation with Mr. Atherton on November 10, the Ambassador called attention to the “new aspects” in relation to the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941, as contained “particularly in the last two paragraphs” of this telegram.↩