Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, Volume I

740.0011 European War 1939/17735: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

London, December 21, 1941—10 p.m.
[Received December 22—1:20 a.m.]

6166. To the Secretary and the President. Following up my No. 6147 December 19, 11 p.m. This afternoon I went down to the Foreign Office. Sir John Anderson,⁹⁷ who has been anonymously acting as Secretary of State during Eden’s absence, the ranking civil servant, Sir Orme Sargent,⁹⁸ and Richard Law, the Parliamentary Secretary, were absent because it was Sunday. I took advantage of Eden’s instructions to his Private Secretary,⁹⁹ who was present, that I should see all messages from him from Russia and was given them to read.

The negotiations did not continue on the same easy basis at the first meeting (see my telegram under reference) but they concluded on a cordial note and ended in a banquet given by Stalin to Eden.

It was mutually agreed to postpone an actual agreement but a communiqué is to be issued instead and released by wireless on midnight December 28–29 Greenwich mean time. It will state identity of views in regard to the conduct of the war especially as regards defeat of Hitlerite Germany and prevention of future German aggression. It will also state that there was an exchange of views on postwar problems relating to peace and security which it will be said have provided useful material for future collaboration of concrete principles.

I am attaching at the end of this message the draft memorandum given to Eden … on his departure from London. His messages do not indicate to what extent he made use of the memorandum but I felt you would be interested in its content.¹

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(Begin memorandum.) “His Majesty’s Government are anxious for early consultation with the Soviet Government in order to determine the best means of uniting their efforts for the winning of the war and for devising and maintaining a durable peace.

2. The conduct of the war must be the subject of a confidential exchange of views, the result of which clearly cannot be given out to the workers.

3. Plans for the peace settlement, on which the views of the United States Government will, of course, be essential, should perhaps in great part remain known only to the three Governments.

4. But it seems highly desirable that the Soviet Government and His Majesty’s Government should forthwith mark their association in a public declaration in the same way as the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government have already, by the Atlantic Charter, together subscribed to certain guiding principles. Thus would be manifested the determination of the three great powers to strive together for the utter defeat of totalitarian aggression, and for the restoration and maintenance of peace.

5. Plainly, the first objective is the total defeat of Germany and it is suggested that the two Governments might pledge themselves not to lay down their arms until the German military power has been so broken as to render it incapable of further threatening the peace of the world, and not to make peace with any government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions.

6. Secondly, as regards the after war period, it will be desirable to plan to keep Germany deprived of the military means of aggression against other countries.

7. As regards the peace settlement and the planning of postwar reconstruction, the Atlantic Charter, of which the Soviet Government has already interviated [intimated?] their acceptance, might be taken as a starting point.

8. His Majesty’s Government for their part would wish to associate themselves with the statement made by M. Stalin on the 6th November when he defined the war aims of the Soviet Government and their attitude towards other countries. M. Stalin’s statement ran as follows:

‘We have not, and we cannot have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territory, the subjugation of foreign peoples, whether it concerns the peoples and territories of Europe, or the peoples and territories of Asia, including Persia. Our first aim consists in liberating our territories and our peoples from the German Fascist yoke.

‘We have not, and we cannot have, such war aims as the forcing of our will and our regime upon the Slavonic or “any other enslaved European peoples, who are expecting our assistance. Our aim consists in helping these peoples in their struggle for liberation against Hitlerite tyranny, and later permitting them freely to settle their own destiny in their own land. No interference in the internal affairs of other people.”[’]

9. At this moment it will probably be found premature to attempt to reach any conclusions as regards the post-war territorial settlement, having regard to clause 2 of the Atlantic Charter, which deprecates any territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. On the other hand, His Majesty’s Government recognize the need in any eventual settlement to strengthen the smaller countries of Europe so as to put them, both economically and strategically, in a position to resist successfully pressure by Germany. For this purpose they welcome the negotiations between the Czechoslovak and Polish Governments for a confederation. They would hope that this federal system might be extended so as to include other states of Central Europe. It is understood, moreover, that this is the intention of the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments. His Majesty’s Government also hope that the various Balkan States may combine to form a similar system. Such confederations should contribute to the establishment of such a permanent system of general security as is foreshadowed in the 8th clause of the Atlantic Charter.

10. In the matter of economic reconstruction His Majesty’s Government hope that the Soviet Government will participate in the coordination of post-war economic policy generally, and His Majesty’s Government trust that the Soviet Government will be ready at the appropriate moment to participate in discussions on the various aspects of this far-reaching [undertaking?].

11. His Majesty’s Government recognize the justice of requiring Germany to make restitution as far as is possible for the spoliation of which she has been guilty during the period of the war. This is a subject, however, which His Majesty’s Government would desire to examine and discuss further with the Soviet Government at a later stage when circumstances will make it easier than at present to reach definite conclusions.

12. His Majesty’s Government will for their part be prepared to assist, in so far as lies in their power, in the economic rehabilitation of the Soviet Union after the war.

13. On all of the above matters the association of the United States Government is essential and the Soviet Government will no doubt agree with His Majesty’s Government that, with this end in view, the United States Government should be kept fully informed of their discussions.

14. It is, of course, recognized that there are many other questions affecting the peace settlement which will have to be discussed between the British and Soviet Governments in consultation with the other Allies and the United States when the elements of appreciation are sufficient to make it possible to reach conclusion.” End memorandum.

Winant

97. Lord President of the Council.
98. Deputy Under Secretary of State.
99. Oliver Charles Harvey.
1. For the portion of this telegram not here printed, see Vol. iv, p. 759.