740.0011 European War 1939/17049: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State 87
[Received 1:34 p.m.]
635. Department’s telegram No. 246, November 27. Finnish Minister at Stockholm, Wasastjerna, dined with me privately last night. Only other person present was Secretary McClintock. He said he had conferred on the previous evening with President Ryti, Foreign Minister Witting and Minister of Defense Walden with regard to Finland’s answer to British ultimatum and that although, of course, he could not speak in name of his Government he could off the record tell us that answer embodied two points: (1) That Finland would shortly terminate operations after achieving certain essential tactical and strategic objectives and (2) that in no case would Finland’s attainment of these objectives endanger British or American interests in far north. Mr. Wasastjerna said that this answer would be delivered to us today.
He repeatedly emphasized hope that some ground for compromise might be found particularly since he said Finnish military operations would not cut across British-American lines of interest—presumably of supply for Russia—in north. He said, for example, that some compromise might be found if Finland agreed not to take Sorokka. However, when we asked what use this inhibition would be if the Germans took Murmansk, he was at first silent and then said he did not think the Germans could take Murmansk without Finnish assistance.
He repeatedly stated that Finland is almost at the end of its war with Russia and in fact mentioned 4 weeks as probably marking cessation of hostilities. He was silent, however, when we remarked that in 4 weeks ice in the far north would be much thicker and that high Finnish officials had consistently spoken of the war in terms of weeks even 6 months ago.
[Page 112]Towards end of long conversation Wasastjerna at last admitted that Finland’s action vis-à-vis Great Britain and United States was conditioned largely by attitude of Berlin. He said it was quite impossible for his Government to formulate a reply which would please British and American Governments without arousing anger in Germany, and seemed to share prevalent view in Government circles that enmity of a comparatively distant Great Britain and United States was to be preferred to that of a closer neighbor, Germany.
Wasastjerna said furthermore that Finland’s policy was conditioned by vital question of food supply. He said that if Finland was not permitted to import food supplies from Sweden (to be replaced by importation under British navicerts) it would have to look to Germany. He said quite candidly that Hitler used food as a political instrument and intimated that time might come when Nazis would foment Finnish hatred of Sweden by pointing out that Sweden was no longer a source of supply while Germany stood ready to send food to starving Finns.
He likewise reflected Government view in repeatedly asking us what advantage Great Britain or United States would gain from a declaration of war without at all realizing the immense advantage which would derive from prompt suspension of hostilities on the part of Finland. We invited him to read the recent statements of Secretaries Hull88 and Stimson89 but felt they did not alter his convictions.
Our impression was that Minister, who has close family ties with England, is a well-known scientist and industrialist and certainly a man of good will in the position of an objective and intelligent person forced by circumstance to repeat the clichés which now make up Finland’s brief. The outstanding impression was his admission that Finland is no longer a free agent and that it stands in the shadow of Germany subservient to the wishes of Hitler. The Minister repeated the statement reported in Stockholm’s telegram of November 13, 2 p.m.90 that a British declaration of war would at once result in an open alliance between Finland and Germany.
Chief of Political Section of Foreign Office last night said to Secretary Gleeck that Finnish reply to British note will state that Finnish Army will stop hostilities in east when they have taken Karhumaki and Uhtua, and that they are prepared to discuss arrangements which will “neutralize” (presumably meaning permitting use of railroad) points where Murmansk railway has been cut by Finnish forces. He indicated that Sorokka, which would be too costly to take, is no longer Finnish military objective. Finns would thus take up defensive positions which will not interrupt communications on Murmansk [Page 113] line. Finns would however insist on Russian evacuation of Hango.