740.0011 European War 1939/6068: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 15—7:25 a.m.]
747. Department’s 589, October 11, 5 p.m. I have heard no confirmation here of any reports that Italy has made any formal demands on France for the establishment of air bases in Syria or for any submarine bases in French North Africa or that it has demanded the complete demobilization of all French forces in Syria. I learn from both French Foreign Office and several high French military sources that Italy has demanded the reduction of all French forces in North Africa to a total of 100,000. I have also been told by French War Department sources that Italy has required a reduction of French forces in Syria to the equivalent of the three divisions which were stationed there prior to September 1939: the French have agreed to this demand and would in any case have returned to North Africa the forces sent to Syria during the war.
[Page 917]With the Department’s telegram in mind I inquired of Charles Roux28 this morning with regard to the Italian attitude in Syria and he replied literally as follows: “The Italians are causing us all possible trouble both in Syria and everywhere else. They are now behaving worse than the Germans.” In spite of my questioning on Syria he would not be more specific other than to mention minor endeavors to stir up some trouble among the natives. He added “Through their armistice commission and other missions they are able to cause all sorts of annoyances and difficulties.”
The above statements and those reported in my telegram 711, October 8, 4 p.m.29 are of course at variance with the statements mentioned in the Department’s telegram 589. There are several explanations. There is, as I have endeavored to stress, an important difference in views between the permanent personnel of the French Foreign Office who retain their ardent hopes for a British victory and who will talk sometimes with relative frankness in private conversation, and the other and more influential elements of the Government. It is more than possible that the telegram which the French Ambassador read to the Under Secretary was written by or transmitted under the instructions of Baudouin30 himself or even under the orders of Laval.31 This should be borne in mind, I feel, when the French Ambassador discusses with the Department various instructions received from Vichy.
It is my recollection that the “false reports” on Italian demands mentioned by the Ambassador emanated largely from the British radio in connection with appeals for support of the de Gaulle movements As the Department is aware that movement is anathema to the entire French Government and any “false reports” mentioned by the B. B. C. in connection with the movement will be eagerly, promptly and publicly denied by Vichy. There is a further possibility that the Italians themselves may have brought sufficient pressure to compel the aforesaid denial. This is a point which French officialdom would be loath to discuss.
(The above mentioned comparison between the German and Italian attitudes today I have heard from military sources too.) Apparently the Germans are for the moment showing a greater willingness to comply with minor French requests. This may be due to one of two factors: As recent displeasure at growing applause for the British cause in movie theaters in occupied France has shown, the Germans are somewhat worried at increasing hostility toward them by the population of the occupied zone and may wish greater “cooperation” [Page 918] from the French Government. In the second place the Germans may be relaxing their severity somewhat in the hope of French acquiescence in their demands for control of French Mediterranean ports. That such demands have actually been made I had confirmed today from another excellent source although they are still officially denied. The Germans may feel that by throwing a few sops the French Government may become more willing to accept their complete control and the loss of its remaining “independence”.