740.0011 European War 1939/5206
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)
The most important fact emerging from the attached telegram19 from our Consul General in Beirut regarding the French Army in Syria and the Lebanon is the intention of the French authorities to maintain the strength of that army at from 40,000 to 60,000 men.
[Page 906]As stated in the telegram, it is assumed that Italy and Germany would not be averse to the maintenance in Syria and the Lebanon of such a force. Although the reasons for this assumption are not given in the telegram they are, it is believed, fairly obvious.
The presence of such a number of French troops would immobilize an approximately equivalent number of British troops in Palestine and thus prevent the reinforcement by that number of British troops in Egypt in case of emergency.
Moreover, the presence of such troops constitutes a possible threat to Turkey’s southwestern border and to that extent hampers Turkey’s freedom of action.
It is not unlikely that, in the absence of any appreciable number of troops in Syria, the British would be tempted to endeavor to occupy the country to prevent its being used as a base against Palestine or Iraq. The Syrians and Lebanese, it is believed, would probably welcome such a British occupation as offering the possibility of the reunion of Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Syria, which the Arabs envisaged at the end of the first World War. As long as French troops are maintained in any considerable numbers in Syria the realization of that partial Arab unity is obstructed.
Moreover, the French troops relieve Italy of any present necessity of endeavoring to occupy the country with the consequent difficult problems of supply.
For all these reasons, accordingly, it appears reasonable to conclude that the continued maintenance of a French army of any appreciable strength in Syria is not contrary to Axis interests, but is even in the interests of Germany and Italy.
- Supra.↩