740.0011 European War 1939/6956: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran ( Engert ) to the Secretary of State

260. Legation’s 248, November 14, 3 p.m., and 253, November 19, 3 p.m. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs34a states he believes ceaseless activity of German diplomacy bodes ill for Near and Middle East if Russia acquiesces. When I asked if he had any news from Moscow as to Soviet intentions he laughed and said he doubted whether Molotov himself knew! He feared the Russo-German understanding whatever it might consist of would be the source of many further dangerous complications for the world as it had become perfectly clear that no reliance whatever could be placed on Hitler’s or Stalin’s promises or guarantees. At the present moment the Soviets had an interest in prolonging the war as much as possible but they were afraid of Germany and their policy was influenced by the daily fluctuations in the fortunes of war. To my question how Iran’s relations with Moscow were shaping he replied that the recent action now showed distinct signs of easing.

The impression is that Iranian fear of the Soviets is a German diplomatic asset which is being utilized for all it is worth. Germany knows that Iran’s fundamental orientation is towards the West rather than Russia, and as Great Britain is at present not considered powerful enough to render effective assistance Germany is posing as Iran’s next friend. The Shah’s fear of communism leads him to hope that Hitler may yet protect Iran against a Bolshevist invasion. See also paragraph 2 of my telegram 117, June 1, 1940. But intelligent Iranians realize that Germany would not protect Iran any more than she protected Rumania and that both Moscow and Berlin are merely plotting to take advantage of Iran’s weakness. In the meantime the Iranian Government is disposed to go as far as possible along the swap of collaboration with the Soviet Union but would probably not submit tamely to military aggression. Moscow’s shadow is lengthening and although there is as yet no clear indication how extensive Soviet ambitions are it must be remembered that in Iran mistrust of Russia is likely to remain more deep and widespread than fear of the Axis.

Engert
  1. Presumably the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.