740.0011 European War 1939/5035: Telegram
The Chargé in Iran (Engert) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 10—8:35 a.m.]
187. Legation’s 186, August 7, noon27 and 170, July 18, 11 a.m. Molotov’s28 reference to Iran29 has revived many contradictory reports [Page 635] regarding Soviet aims in this part of the world but it is less than ever possible to be certain of the correctness of one’s information. My contacts with the new Prime Minister29a are not yet what they were with his predecessor and even the Minister for Foreign Affairs has, since he signed the commercial treaty with Moscow become extremely reticent.
Inquiries among persons with unusually wide contacts indicate that Iranian anxiety had been momentarily allayed by the belief that the Soviets were not prepared to embark upon fresh ventures so soon after the Finnish campaign. However, the annexation of Bessarabia30 and the Baltic States31 has again given rise to pessimism and to a feeling that Iran’s very existence may soon be threatened.
The Shah resents the role of a helpless pawn upon the slippery chess board of power politics and is pathetically anxious to give the impression that he is following his own policy and not that of some great power; nor does he want Iran to become a protectorate either in form or in fact. And as he can be very stubborn when aroused he is credited with a recent instruction to his Foreign Minister that there must be no undue compliance with Soviet demands for he had the firm intention of holding the northern provinces at all costs.
On the other hand his principal advisers are obviously carefully avoiding any action which might be considered provocative by the Soviets and are ready to give in regarding minor adjustments whenever prudence seems to recommend such a course. They recognize that traditionally northern Iran has always been a sphere of Russian influence and that Soviet Russia, having secured herself against the Axis in the west may now take similar measures in the Near and Middle East against Great Britain to link up with a bolshevikized Sinkiang and Mongolia erected against Japan. In any event Russia is at present Iran’s most powerful neighbor for under present circumstances England can do little for Iran. Therefore, although there has never been much public sentiment here in favor of the Allies and the triumph of right and justice would mean little to the people, real anxiety is felt by the Iranian Government as to the outcome of the struggle between Britain and the Axis. The ultimate safety of Iran oddly enough is now considered closely linked with the British cause.
Effect of Jap [Nasi?]-Soviet cooperation is becoming daily more pronounced. Principal danger of the combination is believed to lie in the fact that the Reich is no longer afraid of the Soviets and may thus become the dominant partner in a discreditable scramble to secure strategic and political positions favorable to their ambitions. Backed by threats and bribes beyond this cynical disregard even of appearances, [Page 636] their joint diplomacy is trying to shake the nerve of the Iranian Government and to bluff or browbeat it into political and economic subordination.
Molotov’s crude remarks about Soviet relations with the United States have been referred to by various persons in high positions as proof that Moscow like Berlin is holding the United States in contempt and that unless the democratic world combines against the common danger the last of the world’s bulwarks against bolshevism will fall one by one, Iran considers herself as part of this remaining barrier and being still devoted to the ideal of collective security looks to the democracies to take common action against Soviet-Nazi policies which are [designed to?] frustrate everything the West has ever stood for.
- Not printed.↩
- Vvacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Presumably a reference to Molotov’s speech on Soviet foreign relations to the Supreme Soviet, August 1, 1940. See telegram No. 945, August 1, midnight, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 208.↩
- Ali Mansur.↩
- See vol. i, pp. 444 ff.↩
- See ibid., pp. 357 ff.↩