761.91/219: Telegram
The Chargé in Iran ( Engert ) to the Secretary of State
Tehran
, May
10, 1940—9 a.m.
[Received 11:10 p.m.]
[Received 11:10 p.m.]
106. Department’s 53, May 8, 5 p.m.
- (1)
- According to an extremely reliable source Russia has demanded and has been granted the right to use if and when required 7 Iranian landing fields including 1 at Ahwaz near the oil fields and 1 at Khwash near the Afghanistan frontier. Four of them are being rapidly enlarged and at least 2 new ones are being constructed in compliance with Soviet wishes.
- (2)
- The basis for the demand must of course be sought in article 6 of the treaty of 1921 referred to in paragraph 3 of the Legation’s telegram No. 77, April 17, 9 a.m. But the ostensible reason for invoking it at the present time is probably contained in the last sentence of my 87, April 27, 9 p.m.21 Ever since the concentration of Allied troops in the Middle East and foreign newspaper talk of bombing Baku I understand the Soviet Ambassador has been feigning apprehension lest Iran become a “tool of Britain” and force Moscow to take measures for the protection of the Baku oil fields against possible attacks’ from the south.
- (3)
- Extreme secrecy has marked all recent Soviet moves in Iran and the precise details of the demands alluded to in my telegram 112, October 3, 1939, have never become available. However, the technique of their presentation seems to resemble closely that employed against the Baltic States except that the Soviets have evidently decided not to repeat the mistake made in the case of Finland of making public demands and threats without being sure that Iran will not fight.
- (4)
- Soviet Embassy and German Legation are apparently working in close collaboration in Iran. Both seem determined, although each from different motives, to exploit fully all advantages the Russo-German understanding gives them. Germany has undoubtedly been inciting the Soviets to adopt greater aggressive policy toward Iran and Afghanistan in the hope of weakening and perhaps eliminating British influence. Moscow seems to be tempted by the chance for easy spoils and easy diplomatic or military victories and—as so often pointed out in these telegrams—to secure the larger Soviet objectives of overthrowing capitalism by causing a general social and economic breakdown in as many countries as possible. It is significant that in Iranian official circles the belief is frankly expressed that if the Soviet [Page 632] Union should intervene actively in the European war its intervention would be decisive.
Engert