Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, Volume III

711.61/771: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 30, 1940—8 p.m.
[Received October 31—4:55 a.m.]

1454. Department’s 699, October 26, 3 p.m. I was received yesterday by Vyshinski who granted the interview immediately upon request.

I began our conversation by referring to the sincere desire of my Government to work for greater cooperation with the Soviet Government as evidenced by the discussions which have been taking place in Washington with respect to certain administrative and commercial difficulties and cited in this connection the successful settlement of certain specific questions which had been the subject of complaint on the part of the Soviet Government. I remarked that the efforts of my Government in this respect unfortunately had not thus far been reciprocated and cited several pending matters which I had hoped the Soviet authorities might have found it possible to dispose of. At this point Vyshinski stated that while he was informed that such discussions were in progress in Washington nothing had come of them in so far as he was aware and he inquired what matters had been settled. I outlined to him the understandings already reached with Oumanski, referring particularly to the granting of permission for Soviet engineers to visit the Wright Aeronautical Plant, the assurance of the release of machine tools, not required for our national defense and the favorable decision with respect to the Soviet request for American tankers. Vyshinski then stated that irrespective of any concessions made in Washington, of which he appeared to be uninformed, the Soviet Government had in principle decided to agree to the establishment of a Consulate in Vladivostok and that by November 15 the Embassy would receive additional housing facilities. With respect to the American citizens in Soviet-occupied Poland he was noncommittal and said that he would look into the matter.

Having enlightened Vyshinski as to some of the steps which the Department has already taken in an endeavor to develop a spirit of greater cooperation and to eliminate friction between the two Governments and having received his assurances that the Soviet Government also desires to see an improvement in [relations?], I outlined to him the views contained in the Department’s telegram under reference. Vyshinski listened carefully and then made the following observations which he stated I could accept as the view of his Government:

(1) The Soviet Government has always taken cognizance of aggression, the definition of which has been publicly expressed by Molotov, and it likewise recognizes that aggression is “sometimes without limit”.

(2) The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is a consistent policy directed towards the furtherance of the foreseeable peace. The Soviet Union bases its relations with other countries on this principle and all treaties concluded by it are directed towards this goal since the Soviet Government regards the maintenance of peace as fundamental to its future. In its foreign affairs the Soviet Government is guided by a desire to maintain friendly relations with all countries, a principle which it also regards as of fundamental importance to its future development. Past events have demonstrated that the pursuance of the foregoing policy has not resulted in limiting the freedom of action of the Soviet Union or in isolating it from other countries thus demonstrating the correctness of a Soviet policy.

(3) The Soviet Union is able to protect itself against any aggression.

As you will observe Vyshinski’s remarks which he delivered without hesitation are little more than an exposition of the stereotyped declarations which have been publicly made by Soviet leaders concerning Soviet foreign policy for a longtime past and consequently reveal little as to the real intentions of the Soviet Government at the present time.

In the general conversation which ensued I had occasion to ask Vyshinski whether the Soviet Union contemplated an agreement with Japan in the near future to which he replied that he was not in a position to give me any information on this subject. He then referred to the view which I had expressed to him in accordance with the Department’s instruction that any undertakings limiting its freedom of action given by a great power to the signatories of the above tripartite pact would tend to isolate that power from other free nations and observed in this connection that in his opinion any such development would depend on the nature of the undertakings given and added that the existing agreements between the Soviet Union and Germany¹⁰ had not isolated the Soviet Union from other countries nor, as our conversation proved, had it stood in the way of an exchange of views.

Although Vyshinski’s reply provided little information of a concrete nature as to the intentions of the Soviet Union at the present time in view of his subsequent observation I received the impression that the Soviet Government contemplates an agreement with Japan the extent and exact nature of which cannot be accurately forecast¹¹ and that Vyshinski was endeavoring indirectly to persuade me that should such an agreement be effected it should not result in an impairment of Soviet relations with other countries particularly the United States.

My conversation with Molotov on September 26th reported in my 1238, September 27th, 1 p.m., and my talk with Vyshinski, tend to confirm the Department’s suspicion that Oumanski has not kept his Government fully informed of the progress made in Washington or the spirit in which the concessions were made. This suspicion is further strengthened by a statement recently made to Ward by Valkov, Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office, that, due to the attitude of our Government, Soviet-American relations instead of improving have been deteriorating. I venture to suggest therefore that until the Soviet Government indicates that it is entirely aware of the extent of the concessions made to it and the spirit in which the same have been made no further concessions be granted.

I regard Vyshinski’s immediate and glib exposition of the official and public interpretation of Moscow foreign policy in response to the message I conveyed to him as indicative of a desire to avoid any form of political discussion with the United States at the present time and I am more than ever of the opinion that any concessions made to the Soviet Union in administrative and commercial fields should be affected on the basis of strict reciprocity and with no expectation that they will in the slightest degree affect the political policy of the Soviet Government.

Steinhardt

10. For correspondence concerning wartime cooperation and agreements made between Germany and the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 477 ff.; ibid., 1940, vol. i, pp. 539 ff.
11. The Soviet Union did conclude a neutrality pact with Japan valid for 5 years, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1945, p. 812.