861.20111/2
Memorandum, of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)
Captain Sherman and Lieutenant Commander Oliver, who represents the Navy in the Wright Aeronautical Plant at Paterson, New Jersey, came in to see me this afternoon.
They said that they were considering the advisability of cutting down the privileges granted to the Chinese engineers in the plant so that the Russians could not claim discrimination. I told them that what the Russians wanted was not curtailment of privileges to the Chinese but more privileges for themselves. I asked if, in view of our desire at the present time to come to a better understanding with the Russians, it might not be possible for them to make some kind of a friendly gesture by giving the Russians a little more leeway in the plant without endangering in any degree the public interests of the United States.
Lieutenant Commander Oliver said that one of the difficulties with the Russians arose from the fact that there were about 20 of them in the plant; that they apparently wanted to roam almost at will through those portions of the plant which were not regarded as strictly secret. Employees of the Wright plant had resented the manner in which the Russians had been allowed to see almost everything despite the fact that signs were posted by the Company enjoining secrecy on the part of the employees. The rule had been formerly that the Russians would go around in groups—that is, three Russians accompanied by an official of the Wright plant. These groups were very inquisitive and their presence had not contributed to the work of production. Furthermore, there was a fear on the part of both ONI84 and MID85 that the Soviet engineers, after obtaining a thorough knowledge of the layout of the plant, might communicate what they had learned to certain subversive elements in the United States.
Captain Sherman and Commander Oliver stated that, in view of our hope that some sort of a gesture to the Russians could be made, they would hold a conference with the representatives of the Army in the plant and try to devise some means to let the Russians see more of what was going on without interfering with production or endangering public interests. They said that there was one suggestion they would like to have made to Mr. Oumansky—namely, that the number of Russian engineers in the plant be reduced. It was absurd for 20 Soviet engineers to be stationed in a plant of this kind since it [Page 371] was obviously impossible to be showing to all of them simultaneously the various processes of production. If the number could be reduced to three or four it would be much easier to give these few men a thorough knowledge of the manufacturing methods employed. They further suggested that pending the outcome of the conversations, Mr. Oumansky might be informed that a thorough examination of the situation was being made and that within a few days it would be possible to determine what, if any, changes could be made which would give the Soviet engineers a better opportunity to observe the manufacturing processes.
I said that it was my feeling that it would not be appropriate for the details of any scheme which might be worked out, such as the number of men to be kept at the plant, to be discussed during the conversations between Mr. Welles and Mr. Oumansky. Such details should preferably be worked out at the plant. I promised, however, to pass the views expressed by them on to the Acting Secretary.