Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, Volume III

711.61/738

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] June 12, 1940.

The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics called, at his request. I was familiar with his numerous conferences with other officials in the Department and of the topics discussed, as well as the rather vituperative tone and demeanor of the Ambassador. I therefore proceeded to do most of the talking.

First I reviewed and discussed at some length the extremely dislocated and lawless state of the world as a result of the policies of those who are carrying out plans of conquest by force and applying force in carrying out almost all of their governmental activities. I again reviewed the course of our relations with Soviet Russia, especially since 1933, and referred to our wishes to comply with the urgent desire of Russia for recognition on account of dangerous relations between her and Japan in particular. I pointed out how I and some of my associates had incurred bitter criticism during all the past seven years because of our earnest efforts to cooperate with Russia. We had hoped that this cooperation would be not only for our mutual benefit but that it would be a stabilizing factor in the international situation, and that it would result in discouraging heavy armaments and in preventing possible war in the future. I pointed out how we had been hopelessly disappointed in many important respects in these efforts. I then passed in review the world situation relative to peace and the developments of danger to peace during the past seven years, notwithstanding the constant preachments and strenuous efforts of this Government to work with every other country at all disposed to go in the direction of peace. This especially included Russia. I then said that it was with unspeakable disappointment and regret that all of the efforts of this country in pursuing the foregoing objectives had come to naught; that the world was being rapidly subjected to a reign of force and destruction of most of the worthwhile things; that in these circumstances this Government had proceeded on a new policy of arming and arming and arming in order to defend itself against anybody wherever defense might legitimately be called for; that to this end this Government has no hesitation in taking necessary materials and otherwise conserving all of the commodities needed for this day-and-night program of military armament; that if anything unlawful is done this Government is responsible; that I am not intimating anything on that question; that I need not do so for the purpose of what I am saying; that my Government has no notion of making further sacrifices or engaging in further delays that would in the slightest retard or handicap its program of armament; that here it stands, and the Government of the Ambassador ought to be able to understand and realize that this is exactly our position.

I then said that it was a matter of great disappointment that we could not have the cooperation of Russia to a much fuller and broader extent than we have had during the past seven years, especially in view of the far-reaching extent to which we have gone to encourage and induce such broader cooperation for peace and mutual welfare. The Ambassador then began to speak of the trade discriminations which he says this Government is practicing. I said that I was surprised, in the existing far-reaching exigencies, to see his Government engaging in such small topics of controversy. I said that his Government is discriminating in favor of other countries in its trade methods and that we are saying nothing; that this includes immense war supplies to Germany.²⁷ The Ambassador said this was normal trade. I replied in any event that it comprised immense supplies urgently needed for war, which fact made it vastly different from normal trade. I added that Russia had a perfect right to pursue this trade so far as this Government is concerned, but that we followed a very different policy toward Italy with our trade during the Italian-Ethiopian war,²⁸ holding it down to the pre-war level by a moral embargo. I rested my contention, however, paramountly and primarily on our present policy of conserving supplies and materials for increasing our armaments, and that these references to Soviet policies were only casual.

I said then that in our extreme desire to see Russia pursue a course that would give her a great influence for peace, the President generously offered his good offices to Russia before she invaded Finland.²⁹ The Ambassador rather sarcastically said, yes, but his Government did not very well respond or react to the President’s speech on a certain occasion at that time. I replied that when a giant country has a little microscopic helpless country by the throat and is choking it to death, I must agree that the Government of the large country is not in a position to respond or to react; that naturally the deepest possible silence is about the only recourse in such circumstances. The Ambassador looked uncomfortable but said not a word in reply.

I then said that I was not sure that Mr. Litvinov and Mr. Molotov are really friendly toward this country in view of the disposition to haggle and engage in vituperative language about a number of matters so infinitely small in the light of the present terrific problems that are being grappled with; (and having in mind the bitter and patronizing talk of Molotov to Thurston at Moscow a few days ago, and the loud and vituperative talk of the Ambassador himself here in Washington on all possible occasions) I proceeded to say that Mr. Molotov seems to have gotten on a “high horse” and that I have been hearing of the vituperative talks about Washington by his representative. I then said that this is, in part, my compensation for having undergone biting criticism for seven years in my efforts to keep up anything like desirable relations with Soviet Russia and the reward for my hope of their improvement.

The Ambassador then handed me the accompanying note from Molotov,³⁰ which is self-explanatory. I said that I had already anticipated the contents of this paper, because I had heard nothing harped on except these comparatively small items, and that I must again call his attention to our policy of conserving materials for emergency armament purposes and that nothing would stand in the way of it. There were some brief references to these questions in virtually the same language that they have been discussed between the Ambassador and my associates in the Department and, to some extent, between him and myself some weeks ago. I said that other governments are not raving like his about similar conditions existing between us and those other governments, and that soon even his Government will be obliged to see more clearly that in view of our determination to conserve strategic and other needed materials for armament purposes the operation of the policy is general. The Ambassador repeatedly returned to the matters of difference set out in the written statement handed to me from Molotov. I said it was useless to protract this sort of discussion since I had made clear the broad policy of conservation on which our action primarily rested.

The Ambassador again denied that his Government was aiding Germany any more than normal relations would aid her. I again replied that the Soviet Union had the privilege of taking any of the various courses to which I had referred that she might see fit; that I was not raising any question for discussion on its merits but merely to point out that in effect Russia discriminates as between different countries.

When the Ambassador again returned to some of his complaints I replied that my Government could list a whole ream of earnest complaints against Russia, but that I would not undertake to do so in this connection except to the extent I had gone. He invited me to list any that I might have in mind. I thereupon read off to him the first page of the statement in the files recently dictated by Ambassador Steinhardt,³¹ and added that I could read several additional pages but would not do so.

Finally, I referred again to the long and earnest efforts I and others had made to get along amicably with Russia and on a broad basis of cooperation for all purposes, as heretofore stated, and added that this Government would be glad whenever Russia should see fit to return to a set of policies that would make possible the fuller development of the relations of peace and mutually profitable cooperation in every practicable way. I pointed out that while the amount of Russian trade with this country is relatively small, and that it would be a mistake to exaggerate any special importance that we might attach to it, we would be glad to see it retained and developed, provided it is possible for such development to take place under mutually acceptable relations between the two countries.

27. For correspondence on wartime cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany, see vol. i, pp. 539 ff.
28. For correspondence concerning United States neutrality in the Ethiopian-Italian conflict, see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. iii, pp. 188 ff.
29. See telegraphic instruction No. 252, November 29, 1939, 3:13 p.m., to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, ibid., 1939, vol. i, p. 1003.
30. See note by the Soviet Ambassador, June 12, infra.
31. Not found in Department files.