811.20 Defense (Requisitions)/43½
Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)
I had two telephone conversations with Mr. Oumansky today regarding the difficulties encountered by the Soviet steamship Rodina in taking on cargo and the policy of the American Government with respect to the requisitioning of Soviet machine tools.
Shortly before noon Mr. Oumansky telephoned me to ask if I had any answer as yet to give him to the requests and inquiries made by him during his conversation with me of yesterday. He wanted to know specifically if the authorities in Washington were taking any steps to make it possible for the Rodina to load and depart.
I told Mr. Oumansky that the Department had been informed by the interested governmental authorities that the main reason for the delay in the loading of the Rodina was the failure of Amtorg to cooperate [Page 312] in furnishing the customs officials promptly with sufficient information regarding the character of the cargo to enable them to decide whether or not the various items were needed in the United States in connection with our defense program. Mr. Oumansky asked if that was all that I had to tell him. I replied that it seemed to me that what I had said was rather important if it was desired that the Rodina sail without further delay. I added that according to my understanding, exporters to a number of countries other than the Soviet Union had displayed full cooperation in giving to the customs authorities the information desired regarding machinery destined for export. The authorities therefore had been able to set aside such machinery as was needed by the American Government, and to permit the other machinery to depart. I said I was convinced from the information I had received that if Amtorg had at once given all the information requested the Rodina would probably not have been held up.
Mr. Oumansky said that he was surprised that in reply to his complaints regarding what seemed to be the illegal methods employed in delaying the sailing of the Rodina we were making complaints to him regarding the failure of Amtorg to furnish promptly certain information requested by the customs authorities. I told Mr. Oumansky that we were not complaining, we were merely trying to explain the basis of some of the difficulties of the Rodina. Mr. Oumansky said that it was his understanding that Amtorg had now replied to all of the questions asked it; nevertheless, the loading of cargo was not being permitted. He then went on at great length again to emphasize the fact that the United States Government was discriminating against the Soviet Union in that it was permitting machinery to go forward to Great Britain and France at a time that it was holding up shipments to the Soviet Union. He said that he had no doubt that shipments to other countries were also being held up. Nevertheless, as long as shipments were allowed to go forward freely to Great Britain and France, he must insist in the name of his Government that similar treatment be granted to machinery destined for the Soviet Union.
He asked me if I had any advice to give him which might aid him in replying to the question raised by Mr. Lukashev, the President of Amtorg, on the preceding day. It will be recalled that Mr. Lukashev had asked Mr. Oumansky whether, in view of uncertain conditions in American industry, he should inform his clients in the Soviet Union that he must suspend placing orders in American plants. I told Mr. Oumansky that I had nothing to add to what I had said on the previous day. I said that I was sure that in a short time the situation would be sufficiently clarified to make it possible for Mr. Lukashev to make his decision without advice from us.
[Page 313]Mr. Oumansky asked me if I had any answer to make to his inquiry as to the laws and regulations upon which the various actions of the customs authorities which resulted in the holding up of the ship were based. I told him that I was not prepared to discuss the various laws and regulations involved, some of which appeared to be rather complicated; that if Amtorg desired to raise the question of the legality of what the customs authorities were doing, it could refer the matter to its own legal counsel; and that the only answer that I could make was that during the present national emergency in this country our authorities were being compelled, in order to protect the important interests of the United States, to make use of certain powers which they usually do not employ. I said that although I was convinced that the actions of the customs and other authorities involved were legal, the question as to their legality could be decided only in our courts.
I told Mr. Oumansky that as long as we were on the subject of Amtorg I might tell him that I was very much surprised to hear yesterday that apparently Amtorg had sold for export to Italy 300 tons of rubber which it had imported into this country, despite the fact that it had been informed of our policies with respect to the export of rubber. I said that I hoped that the information which I had received with respect to this, and which apparently had not been fully verified, was inaccurate. It would be exceedingly unfortunate if it should be ascertained that Amtorg had become involved in a transaction which it must know was not in harmony with American governmental policies.
Mr. Oumansky said that he was sure that Amtorg had not engaged in any transaction contrary to American governmental policies. If the records of Amtorg’s purchases during the last two months should be examined, “it would be found that Amtorg had been meticulously carrying out the policies of the American Government, the purposes of which were to curtail Soviet-American trade”. I told Mr. Oumansky that I chose to consider his last remark as a touch of sarcasm to which he did not intend any reply to be made. I did not propose to make any since I had already on numerous occasions endeavored to impress upon him the fact that our policies of curtailing the exports of certain commodities were based primarily upon the necessity for protecting our own interests, and were not aimed at the interests of any other country.
Mr. Oumansky reviewed at length the various ways in which the American Government was discriminating against Soviet trade, and said that he could not emphasize sufficiently strongly the seriousness with which our attitude was being considered in Moscow. It would be impossible for his Government not to take cognizance of what we were doing.
[Page 314]I told Mr. Oumansky that I realized that it was difficult for a person in my position to talk to him in a personal rather than in an official manner. I would, nevertheless, like to make a remark to him which I had no authority to make, provided he would be willing to regard it as a personal comment from myself. He replied that he would be glad to hear what I had to say and would consider it as personal rather than official. I then said, “For a number of months you have been talking to me about discrimination against the Soviet Union, and I have been endeavoring to reply to you. I feel it is terribly unfortunate, in the light of the present world situation, that your Government cannot be made to understand or to take an attitude which will allow us to know that it understands that what we are trying to do may eventually be of benefit not only to the American Government and the American people, but also to the Soviet Government and to the people of the Soviet Union.”
Mr. Oumansky said that my remark was the first indication he had ever received to the effect that what our Government was doing might eventually operate to the benefit also of the Soviet Government. He said that he would be glad at any time to discuss this matter in full with me either personally or officially. This was a subject which certainly deserved exploring. Nevertheless, he must continue his protests and he must make such protests emphatically, so long as the only concrete facts before him were acts of discrimination on the part of the American Government against Soviet trade.
Late in the day Mr. Oumansky again told me by telephone that he had just received word from New York that the customs authorities had ordered the Rodina to unload 60-odd cases of machine tools from among the 80-odd cases which had been taken aboard. He said that this order was a great disappointment to him since he had hoped that in case the American Government decided to requisition some of the tools on board the Rodina the requisitioning could have been limited to a small number. He said he wished, however, to point out that so far as the matter of principle was concerned, it was just as unpermissible from the Soviet point of view for the American Government to seize one tool as for it to seize 50 or 60. He must therefore again make the request that the Rodina be allowed to load all the cargo, including the machine tools destined for the Soviet Union, which it had planned to carry and be permitted to depart at once. I told him that I would convey this information to the appropriate American authorities.
Mr. Oumansky said that perhaps on Monday, June 10, he would request an opportunity to discuss the matter of the Rodina with the Secretary or some other ranking official of the Department.26