Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, Volume III

811.20 Defense (Requisitions)/19

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)

[Washington,] June 1, 1940.

The Soviet Ambassador called me by telephone this morning. He said that he had a new problem which he desired to present to me. The Soviet steamship Rodina has been endeavoring to load in New York a cargo of machinery purchased by Soviet agencies in this country. The Rodina, according to the Ambassador, had noted a lack of cooperation on the part of various American officials in connection with its attempts to take on cargo and get under way. The Ambassador had just received a message from New York to the effect that a United States customs agent had, without advance notice, required additional data with regard to the cargo of the vessel, which data, so far as could be ascertained, had never previously been required with respect to American machinery bound for the Soviet Union, and apparently was not required by published regulations. The customs agent, for instance, was requesting additional information with regard to the names of the manufacturers of the machinery, he was requesting full description of the machinery, and he was asking for serial numbers, and so forth. As a result of the demands of the customs agent, it had become necessary for the vessel to cease loading. In response to questions put to him, the customs agent had said that he had been instructed to obtain the additional information for the use of the Department of State.

The Ambassador said that he hoped that what appeared to be a studied endeavor to interfere with the loading of the Soviet vessel would not turn out to be another instance of American discrimination against Soviet trade. He would appreciate it if I would take up the matter with the appropriate authorities and endeavor to find out who was responsible for the holding up of the loading of the vessel and whether new regulations requiring additional data regarding machinery leaving the United States had been put into effect. He was particularly interested in learning whether similar measures were being applied with respect to shipments destined for countries other than the Soviet Union.

I informed Mr. Oumansky that although I knew nothing whatever about this matter, I was confident that the customs agent was in error in stating that the information desired was for the use of the Department of State. I felt quite sure that such information as serial numbers, description of machines, and so forth, must be for the use of the Treasury authorities rather than for members of the State Department. I told him that I would gladly look into this matter and would inform him of the results of my investigation.

After discussing the matter with Mr. Berle²⁰ and Mr. Dunn,²¹ and having learned from them the circumstances responsible for the delay in the loading of the Rodina, I called the Ambassador by telephone and told him that I was in a position to give him a preliminary reply to the questions which he had put to me earlier in the day. I referred to the conversation which he had had several days ago with Mr. Moffat and myself, during which he had been informed that the American Government was being compelled to requisition against compensation certain machinery manufactured in this country for export abroad which was considered as essential in the carrying out of our defense program. As a result of the adoption by the American Government of the policy of requisitioning, the duty rested upon American authorities not to permit machine tools, and perhaps other machinery, which might be essential to the American defense program, to leave the United States. These authorities, therefore, were endeavoring to obtain data much more comprehensive than previously requested regarding machinery consigned abroad, in order to enable themselves to judge whether or not such machinery was needed in the United States. I said that apparently the additional information requested with respect to the machinery which was scheduled for loading on the Rodina was requested in order to help our authorities to determine whether such machinery might be exported or should be requisitioned.

Mr. Oumansky said that my explanation had left him speechless; that he did not know just how to reply to a statement of the kind which I had made. He asked if I understood that the policy of requisitioning on the part of the American Government was making trade between the Soviet Union and the United States impossible. He said that trade could not be carried on in such circumstances.

I told Mr. Oumansky that the American Government realized and regretted that the policy of requisitioning must result in a certain amount of temporary confusion in certain branches of our export trade. It was hoped, however, that in a short time the situation would be sufficiently clarified to enable our foreign trade to be carried on normally within the framework of new regulations which undoubtedly would be issued. I said that I felt that he was taking an unnecessarily alarming view of the situation; that my understanding was that only that machinery which was deemed essential for our defense program would be requisitioned; and that there was no reason why machinery which was not considered as essential should not be sent to its destination. I emphasized the fact that this measure was in no sense directed against the Soviet Union or against Soviet interests, and that it certainly was not discriminatory. The United States Government was faced with what might be considered as an emergency situation, and in order to meet that situation, it was compelled to take all necessary measures for the national safety. It was regrettable that certain of these measures adversely affected Soviet interests; it should be remembered that they also similarly affected the interests of other countries.

Mr. Oumansky said that he feared that it would be difficult to persuade his Government that the action of the American Government in requisitioning machinery in the United States manufactured for the Soviet Union was not a policy of discrimination. I said that I hoped that in reporting this matter to his Government he would emphasize my statement to him that the policy of requisitioning was not directed against the Soviet Government or against Soviet interests, that it had been adopted solely as a measure for securing the safety of the United States, and that the American authorities would deeply regret it if the execution of this policy should result in inconvenience to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Oumansky said that he would faithfully report to his Government my statements, but, at the same time, he would be compelled to add that he had thus far not been assured that the policy of requisitioning was also to be applied to machinery ordered in the United States by Great Britain and France. I told Mr. Oumansky that obviously I was not in a position to state the extent to which individual countries would be affected, since the policy of requisitioning would be executed on the basis of investigations and reports of technicians. I could say with confidence, however, that if it should be decided that the requisitioning by this Government of certain machinery manufactured in this country was essential to our national security and to the execution of our national defense program, such machinery would be requisitioned regardless of the country for which it had been manufactured.

Mr. Oumansky asked if the Department had as yet received from Mr. Thurston the report of his conversation with Mr. Molotov on the preceding day.²² I replied in the affirmative, and said that I had noted that Mr. Molotov apparently felt very deeply about the matter. Mr. Oumansky said that he did not know what would be the reaction in Moscow, since the delay of the loading of the Rodina must be considered as an answer to Mr. Molotov’s statement to Mr. Thurston. I replied that it hardly seemed necessary, after what I had already said, for me to say that the difficulties encountered in connection with the loading of the Rodina were in no way related to Mr. Molotov’s conversation with Mr. Thurston. The request made by the customs authorities for additional information with respect to the Rodina cargo was prompted only by their desire to carry out certain policies of the American Government adopted solely for the advancement of our defense program.

The Ambassador said that he would like to add in confidence that it was unfortunate that just at a time when trade relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain were showing marked signs of improvement,²³ the American Government should be taking steps which were certain to result in consequences unfavorable to trade between the Soviet Union and the United States. I said that I was of the opinion that if the Soviet Government could be made to understand that the steps which we were taking with respect to requisitioning were not directed against trade between the two countries, the results of these steps would not be so catastrophic as he seemed to believe.

20. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.
21. James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.
22. Supra.
23. For correspondence concerning relations between Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, see vol. i, pp. 589 ff.