711.61/726
Memorandum of Converation, by the Secretary of State
The Soviet Ambassador called at his own request. He cited, at the request of the Soviet Government, most of the grievances contained in telegram No. 332 of March twenty-eighth from our Ambassador at Moscow. His main inquiry concerned itself with the question of whether this Government, in the light of the various alleged acts of obstruction of commerce between the two countries, et cetera, intended to abandon or to continue commercial relations with Russia and I was particular not to comment thereon.
In addition to the replies made by Mr. Moffat and myself heretofore to the grievances mentioned in telegram No. 332, I emphasized further our view regarding several of them. I said that one or two minor phases would be looked into as to the full facts, although I was satisfied that I had ample facts on which to predicate answers. One of these related to the refusal of some American companies to permit a Russian engineer or purchaser within their plants while admitting all others. Another was the protracted detention on Ellis Island of Russian men and women of some prominence who come over on temporary visas. The Ambassador spent a great deal of time repeating these small complaints, referred to above, and I remarked that I had very little time to give to the things he had said, and I then proceeded to dispose in rather short order of his fifty minutes of talk in the manner herein set out.
The Ambassador referred to our circular letter requesting citizens of this country not to export eleven strategic materials91 and brought forward the idea that this prohibition only applied to Russia. I made it clear to him that this applied to all nations alike. I went back to the agreements entered into between this Government and the Soviet Government on the occasion of Minister Litvinoff’s92 visit here, in which it was agreed that Russia would pay certain indebtedness93 and would refrain from propaganda in this country directed from Moscow.94 I said that my Government does not feel that it has been at fault about any disturbance of relations since we took the difficult step in this country of recognizing Russia in 1933 for reasons of peace and [Page 267] mutual progress. I added that, of course, we had been tremendously disappointed in the general accumulation of acts on Russia’s part leading up to the present situation today. I then stated that Russia knew just what had happened, from the breach of the debt and the propaganda obligations down to recent occurrences, all of which have placed this country in an undesirable situation, so far as some phases of its relations with Russia are concerned; that his Government knows very well how to conduct itself so as to make possible normal relations on a thoroughly friendly and mutually satisfactory basis; that this Government does not know what new policy or step Russia may take at any time; that, for example, she plunged into fighting with Finland to the surprise of all of us; that she may take any similar step with no greater surprise than this; and that in these circumstances we are naturally conserving our shipping, our strategic and other materials for the reason that we never know when fighting in the world may call for some kind of self-defense on our part and that we do propose to be ready. I gave the Ambassador no definite answer as to when the moral embargo would terminate except to say, as stated, that we do not know when his country may embark upon another war. I then dismissed the matter because the South African Minister had been waiting for more than thirty minutes.
He denied bombing from the air by his Government, to which I replied that this Government has the most satisfactory evidence of Russian bombing of civilian populations and that I could not convince the Ambassador any more than the Ambassador could convince me to the contrary, in view of the tone of his discussion of the matter.
The Ambassador referred to the fact that his Government had not received any communication from this Government on economic reconstruction after the war, such as was sent to most all other countries.95 I made no definite reply.
He referred to the latest address of Foreign Minister Molotov as setting forth Russian foreign policy. I asked him what kind of neutrality his Government stood for, adding that there are many shades of neutrality as practiced by some countries. His only reply was that it was a neutrality based on the idea of keeping out of war. I inquired whether this meant being drawn into war contrary to the desire or purpose of his Government or war rising out of aggressor action. He would not depart from his original reply to the effect that Russian neutrality was based on keeping the country out of war while disclaiming any aggressor role or purpose. I endeavored to convey a tone of doubt about each profession of the Soviet Government, as referred to by the Ambassador.
[Page 268]The Ambassador stated that his Government had no intention to interfere with Bessarabia and that it was slow to believe that Turkey would become a party to any interference with the Baku oil area by the Allies; and that Russia had no designs on any portion of the Near Eastern area.96 He avoided the subject of Finland as he did Germany.
- See the aide-mémoire of April 9 to the Soviet Embassy, p. 287.↩
- Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1930 to May 3, 1939.↩
- For correspondence on the failure of the negotiations to obtain a settlement of debts, claims, and credits with the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 166 ff. See also ibid., pp. 567–582, passim. ↩
- For correspondence concerning the protest by the United States against interference in the internal affairs of the United States and the activities of the VII Congress of the Communist International, see ibid., pp. 218 ff.↩
- See telegram No. 340, March 14, noon, from the Chargé in France, vol. i, p. 16; see also Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1940, p. 461.↩
- For correspondence regarding the diplomatic activities of the Soviet Union in the Near East and the seizure of Bessarabia, see vol. i, pp. 444 ff.↩