The Ambassador in Colombia (Braden) to the Secretary of State

No. 117

Sir: I have the honor to refer to Page 8 of my despatch No. 76 of April 25, 1939,1 and to report that on the evening of May 10 I dined with the Colombian Minister of Finance, Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo. The Minister and I, in the presence of the President’s Private Secretary, Dr. Humberto Salamanca, discussed the Colombian foreign debt and related matters from 10:00 p.m. until 2:30 a.m. The more important phases of our conversation may be summarized as follows:


I again explained to the Minister that, while neither the State Department nor I could or would intervene directly in the debt problem, we were very much interested to see it solved as soon as possible to the satisfaction of all concerned; moreover, when appropriate, we would always be happy to lend good offices and, recalling his and President Santos’ kind offer to keep me informed, I was interested to learn of recent developments.

History of Negotiations

The Minister replied that he greatly appreciated our interest. He then recited a history of the debt negotiations, with which he, as Comptroller General under the López administration, had been familiar. He said to begin with the Colombian Government had been confused by the multiplicity of entities claiming to represent bond owners. Even after Mr. Hoover2 had been dismissed from the Independent Committee, the Finance Ministry continued to receive communications from that group. Repeatedly, the Colombian Government, in its desire to adjust the matter, had endeavored to reduce negotiations to concrete bases as, for instance, when President López in December 1935 [Page 470] had addressed a long communication to Mr. Reuben Clark of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., to which no reply had ever been received. The Government had hoped for an adjustment when Professor Dana G. Munro3 visited Colombia in July 19374 but were again disappointed, because he refused to express any opinion as to terms and methods of arriving at a debt settlement, declaring that he could only listen to Colombia’s proposals. Nevertheless, he summarily rejected the definite proposal made to him by President López.5 Dr. Munro was uninterested in such important influences as factors affecting Colombia’s ability to pay—the internal political situation, etc. In short, his and the Council’s function seemed to be not of collaboration but simply to refuse all offers until such time as a satisfactory one happened along. Despite the sterility of Professor Munro’s visit, the Colombian Government continued its endeavors to negotiate and did carry forward conversations with Mr. Francis White of the Protective Council until, in late November 1937, Brazil withdrew its support of coffee prices, whereupon Mr. White discontinued discussions. The Minister of Finance in this connection categorically confirmed the assertion made to me in Washington by Ambassador Miguel López that he and the Colombian Government then expressed their desire to pursue negotiations but the Protective Council refused to do so. On this subject the Department will note that there is a flat contradiction between the statements of the Colombians and of Mr. White. Also, ex-President López, quite independently, has corroborated to me all the aforequoted narration by the Minister.

Undiscouraged by these repeated delays, the Minister said, Colombia still had hoped to reach a settlement before the change in administration here, but no progress was made and therefore shortly before President López left office it was suggested negotiations be postponed until after the inauguration of Dr. Santos. Dr. Lleras referred with some bitterness to the cable sent by Mr. Francis White to the incoming President on inauguration day, August 7, 1938.

The Minister went on to say he had hoped rapidly to get congressional approval of a debt program, but his ideas were attacked by many Senators and Deputies who, having become accustomed during [Page 471] five years to a pleasant forgetfulness of obligations, insisted that Colombia emulate Chile,6 claiming that any other procedure would lead to the Government’s negotiators being out-traded. It was only with difficulty that legislation along these lines had been avoided and it had even proved impossible to pass a law appointing a debt commission. This failure was later remedied when on December 1, 1938 the Debt Commission was appointed under the provisions of an obscure rider to a disrelated law concerning the Ministry of Finance. The Commission had been carefully selected to include members influential in all political factions; in truth, the Conservative members had recently been chosen as two of the five directors of that party. The Commission had met and reviewed the information submitted to it by the Minister; it would not be very active but would be most valuable in getting legislative approval for the debt agreement finally consummated. The Minister said that it was essential first to get an agreement and then to submit it to Congress for approval. Were he to endeavor to obtain a blanket authorization in advance it would be rigid, perhaps unworkable and practically equivalent in its provisions to the unilateral offer made by Chile. It was preferable to present a concrete proposal for acceptance or rejection rather than to throw the general subject into an extended and disordered debate. The Government was willing to exercise pressure to obtain congressional ratification of a satisfactory debt agreement but it could not and would not go beyond reasonable limits nor risk the loss of its prestige and influence with the legislature for the balance of President Santos’ term in office. The disposition of the majority of the Senators and Deputies respecting the debt was well known and it would be absolutely impossible for the Government to suggest terms more severe than those proposed by President López to Dr. Munro in July 1937. The administration was anxious to reach an adjustment as soon as possible; in fact it was imperative that the debt agreement be submitted to Congress, when it convenes on July 20, for approval and for inclusion in next year’s budget. The arrangement when made must be a permanent—not a temporary—one. Dr. Lleras feared if matters were not handled in this way but were put over to a future Congress it would be impossible to get the body’s acceptance of another settlement and Colombia would therefore indefinitely continue in default. Speed was also essential because within the next few months there would be held meetings to establish the participation of the several Departments in the taxes received by the National Government. This reallocation of income could not longer be deferred and would mean reduction in net revenues received by the National Government; thus making still less available for loan service.

[Page 472]

The aforementioned López offer, when renewed with minor changes, would be as follows:

Debt service to be resumed with interest at 2 percent for the first year, stepping up one-quarter of one percent each year thereafter until a maximum of 3 percent is reached in the fourth year, at which rate it would continue until extinction of the debt; amortization payments to be calculated on the basis of 50 years from the date of original issuance of the loans, Le. approximately 40 years from the present time. Also, Colombia would wish to have in the agreement a provision permitting it to purchase bonds in the open market.

Recent Developments

I inquired how far negotiations had progressed between Ambassador Miguel López and Mr. Francis White of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc. The Minister replied that in addition to the necessary data already forwarded to Washington, the Ambassador and his advisers had requested further information which had recently been sent. As soon as it was put in final shape the Minister expected it would be submitted forthwith to Mr. White. It was now so complete there could be no legitimate reason for further delay and he believed an agreement would be reached in a surprisingly short time—within a week or two. He again emphasized the need for speed and promised as soon as he received the final figures from Washington he would give them to me. The data to be submitted to Mr. White by the Government conclusively proves that the aforementioned “López” terms are the best Colombia can offer and represent the country’s maximum ability to pay. Mr. White and others had failed to take into account not only political influences in Colombia but also certain cold facts not apparent in the published statistics, such as, for instance, that Colombian cotton imports last year had been arbitrarily reduced by exchange restrictions, therefore the superficial figures frequently gave an erroneous picture of conditions here.

My Opinion of Terms

Towards the end of our interview, Dr. Lleras asked for my opinion of the aforedescribed terms. I answered that my purely personal but nonetheless frank conclusion was they were too low and would create a bad impression, hurtful to Colombia’s reputation. I said primarily it was a moral issue and then one of Colombia reestablishing its credit standing. I mentioned the debt agreements with Santo Domingo, Cuba, Uruguay, Province of Buenos Aires, etc., as indicating that a rate of at least 4 percent for a permanent settlement was necessary to reestablish Colombia’s credit. I recalled that Argentina had not defaulted, yet last year had to pay about 4½ percent for financing. I also referred to the fact that full service on Colombia’s foreign national debt would only amount to 3.3 percent of the country’s revenues [Page 473] and the total national debt service to 12.6 percent, whereas other countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Canada, etc., must devote from 18 to 28 percent of their revenues to debt service. The Minister countered by asking how I explained that Chile’s credit had not been injured by her unilateral imposition of terms, less favorable than those contemplated by Colombia; since according to recent press announcements Chile’s credit must be good because her Finance Minister was leaving for Washington there to negotiate a loan with the United States Government. I replied that, as he well knew, Chile was unable to obtain loans from banking or other private sources and was in a serious economic predicament, which might lead to social repercussions, the gravity of which could not be foreseen; while I had no direct information on the subject, assuming the newspapers were accurate, it was my impression that the United States Government might enter into discussions with the Chilean Finance Minister solely in the spirit of the good neighbor to try and help that country out of a difficult situation; and in the final analysis he surely would not place Colombia on as low an economic plane as Chile now had to endure. I added that I did not pretend even if Colombia were to resume debt service in full it would overnight make available long-term financing, which might have to be deferred for some years, but banking credits would be given, I believed, almost immediately and in the end Colombia would benefit substantially. In this connection I recalled how during the Balmaceda Revolution in Chile7 both the Government and the Revolutionary Party on the due date of a loan in London had made the payment, each fearing that the other would forget to do sd. I had observed 30 years later how this one act had redounded substantially to Chile’s benefit in the negotiation of other loans in the United States. The Minister said my explanation had entirely satisfied him.

I went on to say that even granting the memorandum the Minister had promised to send me proved the “López” terms were the limit of Colombia’s ability to pay, nevertheless that fact could only with much difficulty be gotten over to the American public who, rightly or wrongly, would compare Colombia’s action with that of other countries, such as those I had mentioned. Therefore, if Colombia were to insist upon the 2 to 3 percent basis, I feared its credit and moral reputation would suffer. Despite his previous remarks as to Colombia’s inability to improve on the “López” terms, the Minister requested me to give him copies of my memoranda comparing Colombia’s fiscal situation with those of Cuba, Uruguay, etc. Enclosed are copies of the memoranda8 I delivered to the Minister.

I then told the Minister that I appreciated the political obstacles in Colombia which made it difficult to improve on the “López” terms, [Page 474] therefore I submitted a purely personal idea of my own which probably would not appeal to Mr. White, viz: 3 percent interest on the outstanding national debt would amount to $1,350,000 or approximately 2,400,000 pesos per year, or say X percentage of Colombia’s present annual revenue. The “López” proposal could be made more attractive were 3 percent to be a guaranteed minimum, and an additional fillip given by a proviso that if Government revenues increased the bonds should receive the aforesaid X percentage of those revenues up to a limit of say 5 to 5½ percent on the face value of the bonds. This might in part compensate the bondholder for the low interest rate (3%) stipulated and I felt it should meet with no objections from Congress since that body ought to be willing to pay somewhat more in interest if national income were increased commensurately. The Minister said he had never thought of such a scheme but perhaps it could be put through and it certainly merited study.

Department and Municipalities

I said I assumed the national debt would be adjusted first and then perhaps the Government guaranteed debt. The Minister replied affirmatively and said immediately the national debt were out of the way then a proposal would be made to each of the Departments and Municipalities that the Federal Government represent them in their respective debt negotiations. The Government would not take over the departmental and municipal debts since were it to do so it would never be paid but it was in a better position to negotiate than were those entities.

Banking Group Loan

I asked what would be the Government’s attitude regarding the so called $17,000,000 short-term loan of the National City-First National of Boston banking syndicate. The Minister stated that he wished to have the national debt adjusted first and then was anxious to reach an agreement with that group since it was impossible to continue renewing the loan every three months and he implied that because of the special circumstances—Leticia war9 and pressing financial needs—surrounding the placing of this loan, it deserved preferred treatment. In other words, I gathered that a somewhat higher interest and a much shorter amortization period may be arranged for this transaction than for the bond issues.


The Minister explained that the J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation wanted to be appointed sole agents for the Government in the debt negotiations but had been employed merely as advisers [Page 475] (sic) and Ambassador López bad been definitely instructed that neither Schroeder nor the attorneys, Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson and Shorb, should be given any authority or used other than as counsellors, although it was expected they would be helpful in discussions with Mr. White whose attitude frequently was embarrassing to the Ambassador whereas Schroeder could serve usefully as a buffer.

Bonds Held by Government

The Minister confirmed that in liquidation of amounts owed to the Government the National Treasury had acquired under Decree No. 711 of 193210 $5,997,500 of its foreign debt. In this connection I said I had received a letter dated May 6 from Mr. Warren Pierson, President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, informing me of an impression prevailing in the United States that Colombia was daily trading in its own bonds. I had understood the only bonds ever acquired by the Colombian Government were the aforementioned $5,997,500 but I would like to be reassured on this point. The Minister emphatically stated that my understanding was correct and Colombia had not and was not now purchasing any of its own securities. I inquired whom he thought was responsible for the activity in the New York Stock Market. He replied that, in the first place, he had recently received a communication from the banking firm of White, Weld and Company of New York stating that there was no great activity in Colombian bonds; but his guess was that while some buyers might be individual Colombian citizens the largest traders were probably a Chicago group comprising among others the firm of Welsh and Green. I thanked the Minister and said I would transmit his remarks to Mr. Pierson.

Negotiations in Bogotá

During the conversation the Minister commented on the large amount of time lost in transmitting information to and from the United States. I inquired whether he thought it would facilitate and speed negotiations were they to be transferred to Bogotá, in which case I observed it would be imperative for Ambassador López, because of his familiarity with what had gone before, to come here with the representative of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council. The Minister thought that if negotiations were not rapidly concluded in Washington and New York, as he now hoped they would be, then it might be well to bring the negotiators here.

Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc.

So critical of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., and its officers was the Minister that I drew his attention to the following [Page 476] points: (a) The bond owners mostly had small holdings and were unable to protect their own interests; (b) the houses of issue either could not or would not intervene; (c) his knowledge of the methods of some so-called independent committees surely would satisfy him that their participation was not always beneficial; (d) the only responsible medium left to deal with was the Protective Council but it had to negotiate on bond defaults all over the world, it was paid by voluntary contributions of only ⅛ of 1 percent after a settlement, it therefore lacked funds, perhaps was short of personnel and was continuously subject to criticism from all sides; (e) these considerations placed the Colombian Government under a greater moral obligation than perhaps it would be otherwise. In short, while he might have been annoyed by the Council he should in all fairness make allowance for the impediments it had to overcome and above everything he should remember that it was absolutely honest and its officers stood to make no personal gain irrespective of the settlements put through. Dr. Lleras said he was glad to learn these details and he had always been satisfied as to the integrity of both the Council and its directors.

Stabilization Profit

The Minister stated that the special exchange account previously shown at approximately 17,500,000 pesos had been reduced in November 1938 to approximately 1,500,000 pesos. The difference was the profit made from the stabilization of the currency and had been used to cancel an 8,000,000 peso indebtedness to the Banco de la República, for public works, stabilization fund and other measures.

Exchange Control

I said I assumed all exchange restrictions would be removed immediately the national debt were adjusted, excepting where the retention of those restrictions was vitally important in connection with countries, such as Germany, having compensation agreements. The Minister agreed with me on this. I then told him I did not understand how and why Germany was now getting certain free exchange, amounting to approximately $125,000 per month, beyond the amounts contemplated in the renewal (December 1, 1938) of the German-Colombian agreement of May 21, 1937. I understood this special free exchange for Germans was covered by an informal interchange of notes, supplementing the aforesaid renewal of agreement. I was not making any formal protest but it did seem a bit severe on Americans, operating in Colombia, to have the Germans receive this preference. (It should be noted that Mr. Wright of this Embassy repeatedly has tried to get copies of the aforesaid notes from Señor Bayón of the Exchange Control Office who in each instance refused his request.) Dr. Lleras was unaware of this situation, although he said that Mr. [Page 477] Smith of the National City Bank had told him some time ago that the Germans were receiving certain preferences over the United States but he had given no concrete supporting facts. Dr. Lleras asked me for a copy of the memorandum on this subject, which he noticed I had with me, and said he would communicate the results of his investigations to me. Copy of the memorandum sent to the Minister is enclosed.11

While on this subject the Minister observed that the United States-Colombian Trade Agreement12 must be highly pleasing to us because, since its enactment the latter’s favorable balance had been reduced from $30,000,000 to $4,000,000. I replied that we were not so much interested in whether balances were favorable or otherwise as we were in extending and freeing commerce in all directions and in eliminating harmful restrictions such as were involved in compensation arrangements. In this connection I pointed out that in 1938 the United States had absorbed 53.6 percent of Colombia’s exports but had only participated in 48.8 percent of her imports, thus creating free exchange for this country; whereas the corresponding figures for Germany were 13.7 percent and 17.5 percent. I said I was not complaining but simply calling the facts to his attention.

Dr. Lleras said that aside from preventing the Germans from swamping this market there were three factors to be considered when removing exchange control:

The effect on the fiscal situations of the Departments and Municipalities. The best solution for their troubles would be, as described above, for the National Government to negotiate foreign debt adjustments on their behalf.
In recent years an important textile manufacturing business, protected by the import quota restrictions of exchange control, had grown up here largely in Antioquia. This industry had a peculiar attraction for the Colombians who would not wish to see it injured. If exchange control were lifted, cotton piece goods (yarns?) might flow into this country from the United States in such volume as to damage or perhaps destroy this business. Therefore, could the Colombian trade agreement with the United States be modified to meet this contingency? I told him it was a matter requiring careful study. I would report to the State Department and inform him in due course of my Government’s reaction to this suggestion.
Colombia’s economic strength probably would enable its currency to withstand the removal of exchange control, nevertheless some additional backing for the currency would be reassuring. Dr. Lleras recalled that I had spoken to President Santos concerning a possible loan of gold bullion for stabilization purposes, once the debt was settled. He believed such a loan to the Bank of the Republic would be valuable second line of defense for Colombian currency. He did [Page 478] not feel our agreement with Brazil was particularly applicable to Colombia. Would I please consider and advise him what could be done along these lines. This I promised to do, also telling him it must necessarily be consulted with both the State and Treasury Departments. I said any gold bullion loan would have to be from Treasury to Treasury and I understood while the Brazilian program had met with very wide approval nevertheless congressional authorization was required to put it in effect.

I would appreciate receiving the Department’s instructions in respect to (b) and (c) above.

Export-Import Bank Financing

Mention of the Brazilian agreement led to discussion of what assistance might be given to Colombia by the Export-Import Bank. I told the Minister that as in the case of a bullion loan nothing could be done until a debt adjustment was pretty well assured. Dr. Lleras said Colombia urgently needed financial assistance from the Export-Import Bank or from some other source in order to purchase material for the construction of railroads, including rolling stock, road-making machinery and dredges to keep the channels of the Magdalena River clear. Unless financing were obtained, Colombia would have to go without many essential improvements or overburden the budget by paying for the equipment in one or two years. Hence, Export-Import Bank financing would give Colombia greater leeway and thus permit her safely to do away with exchange control.

The Minister impressed upon me that even more vital than the foregoing was the adequate and sound financing of the Agricultural Credit Bank. That institution had already discounted with the Bank of the Republic thirteen and a half million pesos of the permissible legal maximum of sixteen million pesos. Of course the discount limitations could be raised by law, but he considered it unsound to do so. The proper solution was to increase the Agricultural Credit Bank’s capital by approximately $3,000,000. The development of this enterprise was a paramount issue and there was no place where our assistance would be more appreciated by both the Colombian Government and people. To raise three million dollars from the budget would be too great a sacrifice, particularly if a debt agreement were reached. He earnestly hoped this additional capital for the bank could be financed by the Export-Import Bank and the Colombian Government would itself willingly assume the indebtedness as a direct obligation.

In reply to the Minister, I said that once the debt was adjusted I hoped the Export-Import Bank could help with the financing of purchases of railway equipment, road machinery, dredges, etc., but that a direct investment in the Agricultural Credit Bank I feared might be impossible. However, I would be very glad to give the matter consideration and submit it to my Government for study to determine [Page 479] whether through financial assistance given to the Colombian Government it in turn could make the investment in the Agricultural Credit Bank. The Department’s views on this would be appreciated.

Coastguard Reorganization

Dr. Lleras said still another most important manner in which we could materially assist Colombia was in the reorganization of their coastguard service. Some years ago they bought in the United States a couple of secondhand coastguard cutters, which were antiquated, inefficient, and now required expensive repairs. The amount of smuggling along both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts in Colombia was scandalous. Contraband of all kinds was being run into the country, particularly silk and other goods from Japan. To stop this illicit traffic required four or five good cutters which would cost, he believed, about seven to eight hundred thousand dollars. The prevention of smuggling and the resultant collection of customs duties probably in time would finance the purchase of these vessels. Of equal importance, however, was the matter of national security. He said I, of course, was familiar with the rumors concerning alien activities along the Colombian coast (see my despatch No. 75 of April 21, 1939)13 and particularly if war were to occur in Europe the operation of these new cutters would be of value not only to Colombia but to the United States. He had discussed the matter with the Minister of War who agreed that a complete study and reorganization of the coastguard must be made, attention being given to personnel, purchase of vessels and other equipment and establishment of a base at Cartagena, including drydock facilities for the cutters. Quotations on cutters had been received from Holland and Germany but since the Colombians were so inexperienced in the matter it would be best for the job to be handled by American experts. The Minister had written to Ambassador López in a preliminary way requesting him to investigate what might be done but as yet had received no reply. He would write again and hoped this matter would be considered favorably by the United States Government.


Our conversation ended by both of us agreeing to think over the various points and to get together frequently for discussions thereof. In these talks I shall continue to argue in favor of a settlement which will reestablish Colombia’s good name and credit.

Dr. Lleras gives the impression of being bright, able, honest and possessing good judgment, especially for so young a man. In offering such a sorry prospect for a settlement satisfactory to the bondholders, the Minister, partially as trading strategy, is painting the [Page 480] gloomiest picture. But the fact remains that the long standing default, the inexpert handling of the matter in the past, favorable economic and credit developments here (see my despatch No. 66 of April 17, 1939)14 and internal political influences, all indicate that any substantial improvement over the “López” terms can only be accomplished through the most skillful and intensive efforts. Public and, what is far more important, political sentiment has, as was only to be expected, during the years of default crystallized in favor of a settlement no better than that offered by President López. Even if the Colombian Ambassador and other negotiators become convinced that a higher interest rate should be accepted, it is presently doubtful that the administration would dare support or Congress ratify a settlement on a substantially better basis. We may rail at their incomprehension and even at their Punic faith, but at least an equal share of responsibility for this unhappy situation rests in the United States and their attitude is in line with common experience in governmental debt settlements.

To conclude, it is well to face the hard facts that: (a) If debt service is not renewed this year on some basis, Colombia may continue to default more or less indefinitely; (b) an agreement certainly can now be made on the “López”, or perhaps somewhat better, terms. A bad adjustment is better than none at all. For the bondholders to have 3 percent in hand is preferable to speculating on receiving a higher rate in some indeterminate future, (c) Hence it is the part of wisdom to make the best deal possible for the bondholders—it will in any case be superior to the Chilean offer—and then get on to the new business of reinforcing both our economic and political standing and prestige in Colombia. The financial assistance we may give to this country will in some measure redound to the benefit of the bondholders. To pursue any other course, as indicated in my despatch No. 66, would be somewhat in the nature of biting off our nose to spite our face.

Of course, in my conversations here I have not even hinted at the foregoing; on the contrary I have, if anything, played up the consequences to Colombia’s good name and economy of a failure to agree on better terms.

This country so ardently desires our assistance on stabilization, financing, the Agricultural Credit Bank, coastguard service, etc., that it would be good strategy for conversations on these matters to proceed simultaneously with the debt negotiations. These elements may be utilized as effective trading arguments by which, with no sacrifice to the United States Treasury or the Export-Import Bank, the Colombians may be induced to agree to a better bargain for the bondholders. The advantages obtained might also perhaps lead the Colombian Congress to swallow the bitter pill of higher interest rates.

[Page 481]

The only alternative to this method of attempting to improve the terms of the debt agreement is for negotiations to be transferred to Bogota where facts may be investigated more thoroughly and local political opinion more effectively influenced in favor of terms superior for the bondholder.


Spruille Braden
  1. Not printed.
  2. Laurence E. de S. Hoover, Secretary, Independent Bondholders Committee for Republic of Colombia, New York.
  3. Professor of Latin American history and affairs, Princeton University; representative of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc.
  4. See Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., Annual Report 1937 (New York, 1938), p. 229.
  5. President López informed Professor Munro before his departure from Bogotá in September 1937 that a proposal was being considered which provided for “No reduction of principal; resumption of service with an interest rate of 2 percent to be increased annually by ¼ percent up to a total of 3 percent; amortization at the rate of 1 percent to be used for the purchase of bonds in the open market. The President said that a suggested alternative proposal contemplated a 25 percent reduction in principal, and interest at the rate of 2 percent with annual increases of ½ percent up to a total of 4 percent.” (821.51/2141)
  6. See Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., Annual Report 1937 (New York, 1938), pp. 189 ff.
  7. See Foreign Relations, 1891, pp. 313 ff.
  8. Not printed.
  9. See Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. iv, pp. 199 ff.
  10. Approved April 22, 1932, Diario Oficial, April 23, 1932, p. 211.
  11. Not printed.
  12. Signed September 13, 1935, Executive Agreement Series No. 89; or 49 Stat. 3875. See also Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. iv, pp. 430 ff.
  13. Not printed.
  14. Not printed.