793.94/15369: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 11—11:53 a.m.]
1901. Chauvel, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Office, called on me this morning to show me in greatest confidence a note which had been received last night by the French Government from the British Government dealing with the question of withdrawal of troops from China referred to in your 818, September 7, 7 p.m.22
The British note stated that the American Ambassador in London had communicated the contents of your telegram under reference to the British Government.
The British Government nevertheless was not certain to what extent this statement of the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador indicated that any real support from the American Government could be expected in the Far East. It was the impression of the British Government that while the position of the Government of the United States with regard to Shanghai might be more or less firm the United States would be unwilling to take any position with regard to the Tientsin area in which America had no interests and Great Britain was greatly exposed.
The British note went on to say that the British Government was most apprehensive that at any moment there might be military clashes between the British forces in the Tientsin area and the Japanese. The British Government had decided therefore to suggest to the French Government that the British Government should inform the Japanese Government immediately that since Great Britain needed the troops and officers now in China for use in the war now in progress in Europe these troops would be withdrawn immediately from the Tientsin area; but that the question of withdrawal from the Shanghai area was a more complicated one which was being studied.
The British note went on to say that the British Government hoped that the French Government would agree that this was the wise policy to pursue, and asked for an immediate reply from the French Government.
(Incidentally Leger had made an annotation on the British note stating that when it had been delivered to him by Mr. Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy, Mr. Wright had added the information that Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo was opposed to the withdrawal of British troops from the Tientsin area.)
Chauvel said that both he and Leger were opposed to the policy that the British desired to pursue. They felt that if the British [Page 243] should withdraw their troops in this manner the Japanese would be encouraged to make further demands.
They both felt that there was a possibility that a settlement might be reached of the war between China and Japan provided France, England, and the United States should show sufficient firmness at the present time.
They both felt that the statement of the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on September 7th23 had been of the utmost importance and they desired to reply to the note of the British Government that in view of the statements of the Secretary of State they believed that the French and British Governments should take no action in the premises without previous consultation with the American Government.
I gathered that the French Government would reply to the British Government this morning advising the British Government that in its opinion the French and British Ambassadors in Washington should be instructed to call on you at once to discuss this question.
Chauvel added that he had two pieces of fragmentary information supposedly of great importance. A telegram from the French Ambassador in Tokyo which had been badly garbled in transit a portion of which was missing indicated that on the 26th or 27th of last month the Japanese forces had been defeated severely by Russian forces in an engagement on the Manchurian-Mongolian border. The second piece of information was a brief word from Saint-Quentin24 to the effect that the American Government had information that the German Government through its Ambassador in Moscow had been able to arrange an agreement between the Soviet Union and Japan.25
Chauvel concluded by saying that under the circumstances it was obvious that the question must be discussed in Washington and that the French Government would not acquiesce in the policy proposed by the British note before consultation with Washington.