893.0146/701
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Reference, London’s strictly confidential telegram no. 1541, September 8, 11 p.m.,18 and Department’s telegram no. 844, September 7, 9 p.m., to London.19
On the evening of September 9, with the approval of FE20 and authorization of the Secretary, I talked with Mr. Mallet as follows:
I referred to the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of August 29 on the subject of use of landed armed forces in China and to the Department’s aide-mémoire in reply of September 4. I then read to Mr. Mallet the statements which Mr. Kennedy attributes to Mr. Cadogan21 to the effect that, as the British defense forces at Tientsin consist of only half a battalion, there would be, “if the Japanese attempt to go the limit there”, nothing that those soldiers could do except, if ordered to do so, to die fighting; and that he, Cadogan, thought such a stand would be unwise; and, that the British Government still has under consideration the reply to be made to Japan, it being obvious that they cannot offer a show of force and that what they do in last analysis depends on what the United States does. I said that, on the basis of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of August 29, we had assumed that the British Government had already arrived at fixed conclusions and had given instructions covering such contingencies. I further said that it is our view that it is one thing to yield positions and to submit to impairment or destruction of rights in the presence of force majeure and quite another thing to capitulate to threats or to sign away rights or titles; that, although this Government had felt it desirable to make to the Japanese Government critical and adverse comments on the subject of the “advice” given by the Japanese Government to the belligerent governments and shown “for information” to this Government and at least one other neutral government, we are wondering whether there is really any necessity for the making by the belligerent governments of any specific reply to the Japanese Government’s communication; that there seem to us three possibilities, to give a “yes” answer, to give a “no” answer, or to make no reply at all; and that the making of no reply at all would leave the Japanese guessing and would leave the question open.
Mr. Mallet thanked me for giving him this expression of views and said that he would send off during the night a telegram giving their substance.