793.94/12370
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
| Participants: | Mr. Welles |
| Mr. Kojiro Matsukata (President, Matsukata Japan-Soviet Oil Company, Limited) | |
| Mr. Hornbeck |
Mr. Matsukata’s call on Mr. Welles followed upon a request by Mr. L. J. Hunt of New York City, by letter, and a request made by the Japanese Embassy here that Mr. Welles receive Mr. Matsukata.
Mr. Welles had not been informed that Mr. Matsukata would raise the question which Mr. Matsukata did raise.
Mr. Welles had in advance asked Mr. Hornbeck to be present at the interview.
When Mr. Matsukata entered Mr. Welles’ office, Mr. Welles said to Mr. Matsukata that he had known and had considered it a privilege to know, when he was in Japan in the years at the beginning of the World War, Mr. Matsukata’s father,64 and that he was very glad to meet that father’s son.
Mr. Matsukata appropriately acknowledged this friendly overture, remarked that Mr. Welles had mentioned meeting his father during the World War, and made the observation that he, Matsukata, had now come here at a time when Japan was “at war.” He then referred to some features of the present situation and led up to and made an inquiry whether the American Government might not tender to Japan and China the good offices of this country. He developed his statement and inquiry in a manner which implied or warranted [Page 45] inference that he felt that the existing situation is one of disadvantage and hazard to Japan, and he stressed the possibility of its leading to serious controversy or conflict between Japan and other countries, with the implication that it therefore makes the position of other countries hazardous.
Mr. Welles said that he wished to be perfectly frank and wished to make the attitude and position of this Government clear beyond the possibility of any misunderstanding. He would ask Mr. Hornbeck to state on what occasions this Government had already proffered its good offices. Mr. Hornbeck said that, on July 12, five days after the first armed clash between the Japanese and the Chinese near Peiping, the Secretary of State, in conversation with the Japanese Ambassador,65 had stated that this Government regretted the outbreak of these hostilities, hoped that they would not spread, and would be prepared to be of assistance to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, if they were willing, toward composing their differences; that the Secretary had said the same thing to the Chinese Ambassador at that time; and that, thereafter, on the occasion of almost every interview which he had had with the Japanese and the Chinese Ambassadors respectively, the Secretary had reiterated those points. Mr. Welles raised question of the position taken by this Government at the Brussels Conference, and Mr. Hornbeck went on to say that at the Brussels Conference this Government and the other Conference powers, taking note of the Japanese Government’s reply to the Belgian Government’s invitation in terms indicating that the Japanese Government was not prepared to attend the Conference, had suggested to and requested of the Japanese Government that that Government appoint a representative to confer with representatives of a few or a small number of the powers; and that the Japanese Government had replied that it was not prepared to do that.
Mr. Welles then referred to Mr. Matsukata’s inquiry and stated that he, Mr. Welles, having lived three years in Japan, had long had a most friendly feeling toward the Japanese people and a great admiration of their many splendid qualities and outstanding achievements; that he shared Mr. Matsukata’s view that the present situation is deplorable and fraught with hazards; that the Government of the United States has from the outset been desirous of contributing toward ameliorating the situation in the Far East and toward composing the conflict which is going on there. We have repeatedly proferred our good offices. The Japanese Government has at no time responded favorably. It is our understanding that the German Government a few weeks ago took steps toward mediation, that the Japanese [Page 46] Government informed the German Ambassador in China of the Japanese Government’s peace proposals, that the German Ambassador laid these before the Chinese Government, and that the Chinese Government did not find the proposals acceptable. The American Government could not take at this time an initiative; it could act only if it were informed officially by the Japanese Government and by the Chinese Government respectively that those Governments desire an exercise of good offices by it; and that, if we were to embark upon exercise of good offices, our action would have to be on the basis of terms consistent with the Nine Power Treaty.
Mr. Matsukata appeared disconcerted. He said that if the American Government felt that it must fall back on “historical” ground and insist on applying the Nine Power Treaty the whole problem was made very difficult.
Mr. Welles commented on that statement, to the effect that the American Government did not regard the Nine Power Treaty as being merely an “historical” instrument; that this Government regards that treaty as an agreement still in effect between and among the powers parties to it, among which are both Japan and the United States, and that, as we have on several occasions stated, such an agreement is binding until it has been made not so by the common assent of the parties to it, a procedure quite different from a unilateral disregard of it by some one of the parties. Mr. Welles asked whether Mr. Hornbeck would care to make any comment.
Mr. Hornbeck referred to the fact that in 1933 or 1934 this Government, in a communication to the Japanese Government through Mr. Grew,66 had expressly and formally stated that in our view the provisions of treaties can be altered, but only by recognized processes. He continued, with the raising of an hypothetical question: Suppose that the question of the Nine Power Treaty could be left out of consideration, suppose there were no such treaty; could Mr. Matsukata expect the American Government, in view of the facts that the Germans have been endeavoring to bring about a mediation and that Japan’s terms have been communicated to the Chinese and that those terms are what they are and that the Chinese have rejected them,—could the American Government at this moment step in and proffer its good offices? Mr. Matsukata replied that the United States was very different from Germany; that the Japanese had confidence in the United States; that the United States is a great and powerful and friendly power; and that he thought that a proffer on our part would be listened to. He said that the Japanese felt kindly toward the United States but were now not well disposed toward Great Britain; that Americans treated the Japanese with an attitude of understanding [Page 47] and consideration but that the British did not; that the Japanese would be receptive toward any efforts which the United States might make in the direction of and in connection with mediation; but that if the British were included in the making of such an effort the Japanese would react unfavorably.
Mr. Welles said that he wanted to make one point perfectly clear; that Mr. Matsukata must not infer from what Mr. Hornbeck had said that the facts of the existence of the Nine Power Treaty and of matters appertaining thereto could be set aside or left out of consideration. He pointed out that Mr. Hornbeck simply asked a hypothetical question. Mr. Hornbeck said that he too felt it important that Mr. Matsukata should not infer from what he had said that the Nine Power Treaty could be left out of consideration.
Mr. Matsukata again indicated that he felt that this view on the part of the American Government made the question of bringing the hostilities to an end very difficult; and he made a plea for our sweeping all such considerations aside and concentrating entirely on the fact that there exists in the Far East a tragic situation potential of producing even worse situations. He again urged that the United States should take an initiative.
Mr. Welles stated that our position was as follows:
First, That action in the direction of mediation could be taken by this Government only if there came to it an official indication from the Japanese Government and a similar indication from the Chinese Government that good offices or mediation by this Government are desired by those Governments respectively; Second, That this Government could act only on the basis of and in the light of its being understood that the settlement must be consistent with both the principles and the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty; and Third, That it is the position of this Government that the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty are susceptible of modification, amendment and alteration, but only by recognized processes of negotiation and agreement, not by unilateral action on the part of any one power.
Mr. Matsukata arose to take leave. He thanked Mr. Welles for having received him and given him so much time. Mr. Welles again expressed his admiration of Mr. Matsukata’s father and his pleasure at having met Mr. Matsukata. Mr. Matsukata, in saying good-bye to Mr. Hornbeck, remarked, “Do not be too hard on us.” Mr. Hornbeck, surprised at this remark, replied that none of us has any desire to be “hard on” Japan; that we are animated by no feeling of hostility; and that we are all intent on and hopeful of doing something constructively helpful in our relations with countries of the Far East. Mr. Matsukata said, “In that case it will be all right.”
The interview there ended.
[Page 48]Addenda.
- 1.
- At an early point in this conversation Mr. Welles took occasion to speak of the adverse effect on public opinion in this country which had been produced by the Panay incident and other unwarranted acts by the Japanese armed forces.
- 2.
- At a late point in the conversation Mr. Matsukata asked expressly whether Mr. Welles had been informed by Mr. Grew of Japan’s peace proposals. Mr. Welles said that he had been informed. Mr. Matsukata asked whether the American Government could not look with approval upon those proposals. Mr. Welles said that before it would be possible for him to come to any conclusion in that connection it would be necessary for him to have more precise knowledge of the implications of the proposals; the proposals were in general and broad terms.
- Former Japanese Prime Minister and “Elder Statesman” (Genro) who died in 1923.↩
- See memorandum of July 12, 1937, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 316.↩
- See Department’s telegram No. 59, April 28, 1934, 7 p.m., Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 231.↩