761.93 Manchuria/200: Telegram
The First Secretary of Embassy in China (Salisbury) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 17—6 a.m.]
501. 1. American correspondent of the Associated Press who has just returned from Changkufeng area states that: (a) Following minor skirmishes the first serious fighting occurred July 29, when Soviet planes bombed the railway along the Tumen River; (b) Soviet troops which had momentarily occupied Changkufeng Hill were subsequently driven off the hill by Japanese under instructions; (c) Soviet troops who had taken the hill and succeeded at least once and possibly twice in reoccupying a part or all of the hill temporarily; (d) Japanese troops were in occupation of the crest of the hill when hostilities ceased which made them victors in a military sense; (e) the Japanese also gained a diplomatic victory in that, although the original Russian contention was that the boundary went through the crest of Changkufeng, by the truce arrangements the boundary accepted by the respective forces was east of Changkufeng Hill and between the hill and the lake which is east of the hill. He said he thought that Soviet casualties were, as stated by the Japanese, far greater than Japanese casualties because the Soviet troops made several attacks over difficult terrain including swamps at either end of the lake, but Japanese statements concerning bombing of Korean villages were questionable as there was little actual damage to civilian life and property. Three disabled Soviet tanks were visible on the hill but no facilities were provided to enable a view of Soviet planes stated to have been brought down, which he believed to have been three in number. He said that the accuracy of Soviet artillery and the speed of Soviet planes were remarkable and that both could easily have done more damage to the Japanese side if the Soviet had evidently not wished to aggravate the situation too greatly.
[Page 483]2. He said (a) the fighting on the Japanese side was done by the Korean Army; (b) the Kwantung Army was now massing large numbers of troops near the border and expected further trouble; (c) military and civilian Japanese in Manchuria generally did not connect the border incidents with the hostilities in China but considered them as a separate problem arising from the General Lyushikov31 affair; that is, the alleged Lyushikov’s statements derogatory of the Soviet military establishment made it seem necessary to the Far Eastern Soviet commanders (1) to demonstrate to Stalin that they were loyal to him and prepared to defend Soviet territory, and (2) to demonstrate to the Japanese that the report of their weakness was false and that they were prepared for any contingencies.
3. He said that in his opinion further serious friction between Soviet and Japanese troops were inevitable.
4. Repeated to Chungking, Tokyo, Shanghai.
- Chief of Far Eastern Krai of Soviet Commissariat for Internal Affairs; he deserted to Manchuria.↩