761.93 Manchuria/185: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 14—11 a.m.]
254. My telegram No. 245, August 10, 3 p.m.29 There has been no further editorial comment on the Japanese conflict and reference thereto in the Soviet press has been confined to the publication of favorable foreign comment. This favorable reaction is also reflected in Soviet circles.
Although judging from the communiqué issued on August 11 the conclusion reached in the conversation between Litvinov and the Japanese Ambassador wherein the cessation of hostilities was agreed upon represented to some extent a compromise on both sides, it is generally regarded that Litvinov’s proposal constituted at least a diplomatic recession from the position which he had maintained up to that moment.
Litvinov had firmly insisted upon the withdrawal [of] the Japanese troops from the territory under contention and upon the recognition by the Japanese of the line drawn on the map annexed to the Hunchun Treaty. On the basis of the Soviet military communiqué (see my 237, August 7, 11 p.m., and 247, August 11, 10 [9] a.m.) it would appear that the tactical position of the Soviets was less favorable on August 10 than on August 7 inasmuch as Japanese troops were admitted to be on Soviet territory on the former date. Litvinov however agreed on August 10th to a cessation of hostilities without apparently insisting upon complete satisfaction as to the conditions hitherto maintained by him. The query therefore arises as to the reasons which prompted this modification of the former position.
[Page 480]In foreign circles here the opinion is prevalent that military developments constituted an important factor in the final negotiations. According to this view, Litvinov had been instructed by the Kremlin, on the assumption that the Japanese did not want war, to adopt a firm stand in his conversations with the Japanese Ambassador and, even in the face of the serious possibilities inherent in such tactics, not to deviate from that stand, during the course of the military operations, unless so instructed. On August 10th, however, notwithstanding the implications of the communiqués, the military situation was apparently found to be in fact favorable to the Soviets with the added possibility that reinforced opposition from the Japanese side might jeopardize that advantage and therefore a cessation of hostilities was regarded as acceptable or desirable from the Soviet point of view. Litvinov therefore was ordered by the Kremlin to bring about a quick termination of the deadlock in the dispute although it involved a certain compromise of the diplomatic position heretofore maintained by the Soviet Government and accordingly the accord outlined in the communiqué of August 11 was reached. In support of this view attention is called to the rapidity in which the decision was apparently put into operation as evidenced by the lack of information in military circles as to the actual termination of hostilities on August 11 (see my 249, August 11, 11 a.m.30).
In regard to the controversy as a whole, aside from the simple explanation that the incident arose from and was developed on the basis of the local issues involved, with special reference to the strategic importance of the disputed position, the possibility is also suggested that the Political Bureau was interested in exploiting the effect throughout the world and in Central Europe in particular of a demonstration of force on the part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it is suggested that as the incident developed the Japanese were not averse to making a reconnaissance of the present fighting ability and morale of the Red Army at the present time and that furthermore the Kwantung Army for its part was ready to engage in a reconnaissance of this nature on the Far Eastern front. These factors may be more clearly developed in the course of the process of negotiating the concrete questions as to frontier and treaty matters which are still involved in a final settlement of the present controversy.
A more comprehensive evaluation however of the various considerations which may have prompted the Soviet Government throughout this controversy would depend upon a clearer definition of the policy of the Japanese Government than the negotiations here have so far revealed and in particular upon more accurate information than is at present available in Moscow in regard to the positions held by [Page 481] the respective military forces in the later stages of the conflict as well as concerning the actual combat efficiency of the Red Army as demonstrated in the course of the hostilities.