761.93 Manchuria/191
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador26 called on his own request. He said he and his wife were down from Hot Springs, Virginia, for a few days and that while here he desired to call, both to pay his respects and to point out the Japanese position with respect to the controversy between Japan and Soviet Russia over the frontier near the Tumen River. The Ambassador said that there had been a Treaty of 1860 and later a Treaty of 1886, that the Treaty of 1886 left the Changkufeng mountain or hill on the Japanese side; that the Soviets claim it to be on their side of the line; and that the Soviet claim is based on a change in the bed of the river. He said that early in July the Soviets moved some troops to Changkufeng hill and occupied it; that there has been desultory fighting since that time; that on yesterday the press reported the Soviets in possession of this hill, while today the Ambassador understands the Japanese are in possession of it. He said that this hill affords an artillery range not only across the Tumen River but to and beyond the railroad running from Kashin on the coast to Hsinking, which is the chief inlet and outlet of Japan into Manchuria and on into North China. The Ambassador two or three times emphasized the view that his country is very desirous of making this a local incident and nothing more; that to this end his Government has proposed to the Soviet Government that the two governments agree that, as a first step, fighting shall be stopped; that they then agree on the withdrawal of troops from a given area to be decided upon; that finally a commission be agreed upon which would set about to solve the trouble. The Ambassador several times repeated [Page 477] his statement that Litvinov is very incorrigible in effect; that he insists that before any steps towards a cessation of clashes and fighting shall take place the Japanese must withdraw from Changkuf eng hill and back beyond what the Soviets claim is the present border line between the two countries. The Ambassador said that he cannot fathom the mind of Litvinov in thus being so disturbing. He then said that Litvinov might, of course, think that the closer alliance between Great Britain and France would be calculated to sever the alliance between France and Soviet Russia and therefore they would make this demonstration in order to stimulate and unify and encourage the Soviet people. He then said that Litvinov, of course, might be prompted upon the theory that he would divert Japan from its movements toward Hankow and other points in southern and central China; that this idea could only be based upon the theory that Japan is more or less worn down in her military strength and power.
I inquired as to how many troops the Russians have in this Pacific area and he replied that they already had 250,000, have since increased the number to 300,000, and are bringing in more troops from the interior of the Soviet Union. I inquired how many aeroplanes the Soviets have in this area, and he replied 1000. He then answered another question by saying that the Soviets have a number of submarines near Vladivostok. The Ambassador said that several Soviet aeroplanes have flown over Korea up to Rashin and Yuki and have dropped some bombs, including some on an interior point between; but that Japan has declined to send up a single aeroplane thus far. The Ambassador appeared very much worried about the offensive attitude of the Soviets. He did not say whether the Japanese would go on in an effort to hold the Changkuf eng hill or whether they would give way in the interest of peace. He only repeated more than twice Japan’s extreme desire to restrict this clash to a local incident.
- Hirosi Saito.↩