761.93 Manchuria/174: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 9—1:30 p.m.]
243. My telegram No. 239, August 8, 11 a.m. I understand that the Japanese Ambassador is manifesting greater pessimism following [Page 475] his last conversation with Litvinov and professes to be unable to understand Litvinov’s attitude toward the Japanese proposal for cessation of hostilities in view of the fact that Litvinov stated that there were no Japanese troops at that time on Soviet territory and consequently the Soviet insistence on the removal of Japanese troops from territory claimed as Soviet as a condition precedent to any agreement had, on the basis of this admission, been met. I understand further that the Ambassador states that the communiqué of the interview while substantially correct failed to mention that the Japanese Ambassador had refused to accept Litvinov’s version that Japanese troops had attacked on August 5 and that Japanese forces had provoked the incident at Grodekovo and had said that in both instances Soviet troops had taken the initiative. It is furthermore reported that the Japanese Ambassador admitted yesterday that the Russian troops were believed to be in occupancy of some part but not all of the Height Changkuf eng.
The declaration, as published in the communiqué of August 8 to the effect that Litvinov after stating that no Japanese troops were on Soviet territory did not meet the Japanese proposal for an immediate cessation of hostilities, has given rise to speculation in foreign circles as to the possible motives actuating this stand. The following opinions have been suggested possible explanation: (1) That Litvinov’s statement and the military communiqué were not in accordance with the facts and that Japanese troops were still in occupancy of what the Soviet Government considers to be Soviet territory; (2) that as fighting was presumably still continuing Litvinov envisaged the possibility that before the cessation of hostilities could be actually effected the military situation might alter in favor of the Japanese and that contrary to his previous stand he would then be in the position of having agreed to a cessation of hostilities while Japanese troops were actually in occupation of Soviet territory, or (8) that the Soviet Government or Litvinov in the hope of exacting further concessions from the Japanese in regard to the general question of border incidents along the entire frontier is not desirous at the present time of terminating the incident. In support of the last explanation, it may be pointed out that the last paragraph of the Soviet communiqué on the conversation introduced an element heretofore not present in the Soviet demands, namely, that some general assurance will be sought from the Japanese against the recurrence of similar frontier incidents in the future.
Up to the present, at least from the published communiqués of the Soviet Government and from other information available to the Embassy, there appears to be no evidence that the Soviet Government intends to recede from the position which it has maintained since the beginning of the controversy and there is an intimation in [Page 476] the request for a general assurance as indicated above that the Soviet Government may even be broadening its original position. In this way the Soviet Government, on the supposition that the Japanese do not intend to engage in a general war with the Soviet Union at the present time, may be endeavoring to secure as complete a diplomatic victory as possible in the present instance and may be manifesting an uncompromising attitude in this controversy with a view to enhancing Soviet prestige in general throughout the world at this particular moment. As regards Litvinov’s personal role in the present controversy, the consideration should not be excluded that the firm attitude which he has displayed may be motivated by a desire for the maximum of success with a view to enhancing his own standing with the Kremlin and his personal reputation abroad.