Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/12578: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 4, 1938—8 p.m.
[Received March 4—4:43 p.m.]

59. In a conference which I had with Litvinov⁸² yesterday, he described a meeting of Eden, Delbos,⁸³ Wellington Koo and himself held in Geneva last month in which the Japanese situation was discussed. He said that the discussion had to do with renewed efforts along the lines of the Brussels Conference;⁸⁴ that Delbos would take no definite stand without England’s express backing on account of the fear for Indo-China; that Eden would take no stand without assurance of parallel action by the United States; that the situation was left with the understanding that Eden would explore the situation with Washington; that it was recognized that the United States Government would participate in no alliance but hope was had that something might be accomplished through parallel action; that what specifically was considered was not military or naval action but the imposing of sanctions that would prevent Japanese banking institutions from selling securities in enterprises in China and Manchuria among nationals of these countries and, second, the possibility of imposing sanctions on supplies, particularly oil. Litvinov was pessimistic as to outcome of any such plan. As illustrative, he pointed out that an embargo on oil would require not only action by the United States but also action by Holland and that in all probability Holland would not participate except under guaranties of military and naval defense by the other powers.

I gathered that the Soviet attitude, similar to French and English, was that it will take no action except with the assured support of France or England or both.

With reference to the European situation, Litvinov’s opinion was that Hitler and Mussolini had Chamberlain on the spot; that Chamberlain had to make good with his public by effecting some arrangement; that the dictators would either drive so hard a bargain as to make that impossible or that Chamberlain would secure a paper peace that really amounted to nothing except as a sham for home consumption.

Davies

82. Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
83. French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
84. See Foreign Relations, 1937, vol. iv, pp. 155 ff.