760F.62/914: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Kennedy ) to the Secretary of State

970. My 966, September 19, 3 p.m. I have just left the Prime Minister. He did not have much to add to the note which has now been sent to Beneš, the substance of which we cabled you this morning, except to say that he had sent a personal message to Beneš telling him Runciman felt that Beneš’ last offer for settlement of the Sudeten problem was entirely beyond hope now; the nature of affairs had reached such a state that nothing but separation of the Sudeten region was possible.

Chamberlain cabled Hitler saying he would probably see him on Wednesday and received a reply from Hitler that that would be very fine. Hitler asked Chamberlain if he could give out a statement tonight with this information about their next meeting. Chamberlain answered not until they had received some indication of Beneš’ reply. He said that the French impressed him yesterday as coming over with their tongues out looking for some way to save themselves from war; that although a number of times during the conference there were sad words spoken about Czechoslovakia they were always followed up by, [Page 622] “We must take a realistic view of the whole question.” When the meeting was almost over Chamberlain said he asked Daladier, “Supposing Beneš answered ‘no’; what do you propose to do?” Daladier said he supposed he would be held by his treaty and would have to march. Chamberlain, said, “How are you going to reconcile a martial war with the fact that you have already gone on record as saying you do not believe in the principle?” Daladier said he had not thought of that.

My own impression is that unless there is a terrific rise of public opinion all over the world, England does not propose to fight on the Czechoslovak issue.

Chamberlain also told me that Henderson had gone to see Goering to make it clear that the British would regard it as an insult if, while these negotiations were on, Hitler gave the order to march. Goering said that they need not be afraid of that unless there is a catastrophe. I asked Chamberlain what he thought that might be and he said a military coup on the part of the Czechoslovak Army, which he thinks is not at all unlikely because even though Beneš might agree to the terms it is conceivably possible that the army may refuse to. In that event Chamberlain is convinced that Hitler would march at once.

He has had some objection in his Cabinet to the whole plan and he realizes he is going to be charged with the rape of Czechoslovakia, but he always says war is the alternative and, “I can see no rhyme nor reason in fighting for a cause which, if I went to war for it, I would have to settle after it was over in about the same way I suggest settling it now.” He looked a little tired and I think he is quite worried. I heard this morning that Oliver Stanley,43 Winterton, Duff-Cooper44 and Elliott45 were very lukewarm on the whole proposition; that possibly Hore-Belisha46 would join them, but on the general principle of trying to work the problem out they have gone along with Chamberlain.

If he gets an answer from Beneš that permits him to move, he will leave Wednesday for Germany.

Kennedy
  1. President of the British Board of Trade.
  2. Alfred Duff Cooper, First Lord of the British Admiralty.
  3. Walter E. Elliott, British Minister for Health.
  4. Leslie Hore-Belisha, British Secretary of State for War.