760F.62/916: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 19—3:53 p.m.]
1509. Bonnet has just informed me that the joint telegram of the British and French Governments proposing to Beneš that he should cede at once to Germany the districts containing 52 [50?]% of Germans and over has been despatched to Praha.
I asked what would happen to the Czech minority in these districts and to the German minority in the remainder of Czechoslovakia and Bonnet said that there would be an exchange of populations. I asked him if Chamberlain had discussed this question of exchange of populations with Hitler and he replied that he had. I repeated the question and he repeated the assertion. I asked if Hitler would accept this solution. Bonnet said that since he had asked only for a plebiscite and was being handed the Sudeten Chamberlain was confident he would accept.
Bonnet said further that the British Government had informed Praha officially today that if the British-French proposal should be rejected by the Czechoslovak Government, Great Britain would not come to the support of Czechoslovakia under any circumstances no matter what might happen. On the other hand if the Czechs should accept the proposal Great Britain would be prepared to enter into an international guarantee of the Czechoslovak State.
I asked Bonnet what the position of France would be if Beneš should refuse and he replied that the position of France would be the same as the British position. France positively would not march in support of Czechoslovakia. I ventured to doubt the accuracy of this statement and said that I believed Daladier was more belligerent than he was. Bonnet replied that on the contrary Daladier agreed entirely and it was Daladier and not himself who had conducted the discussion in London in the course of which this point had been brought out.
I said to Bonnet that nevertheless I could not imagine the French public remaining quiet and watching the Czechoslovak Army slowly destroyed by the German Army. Bonnet replied that he could imagine it very well; the people of France desired nothing but peace; at least 80% of the population was opposed to going to war under any conditions in support of Czechoslovakia.
I said that on the contrary I should expect an immense public reaction led by the Communists and the Socialists. Bonnet said that the Communists would make all the trouble they could; but he did not believe the Socialists would, and he did not anticipate any serious internal troubles.
[Page 621]I then alluded to the possibility that the Poles and Hungarians would strike if recession should be accorded to the Sudeten and withheld from the Polish and Hungarian minorities. Bonnet said that it was nonsense for the Poles to take this attitude. The question was one of peace and war in Europe. There were 3½ million Germans involved and only 40,000 Poles (the Poles say 200,000. There are 90,000), and the Poles and Hungarians could perfectly well wait for 2 or 3 months and then have their plebiscites.
I said that I remained pessimistic. What would happen if Beneš should refuse? Bonnet said: “He cannot refuse. We will not let Beneš in order to maintain the domination of 7 million Czechs over 3½ million Germans drive 40 million French people to their deaths and he knows it.”
Bonnet said that if the French Government had refused Chamberlain’s proposal he would have considered the danger of war enormous. As it was he did not.
Altogether Bonnet was much more confident than I had expected to find him. He had received no indication with regard to Beneš’ reaction to the British-French proposal.