760F.62/911: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 19—5:13 p.m.]
462. In these anxious days of waiting the Italian attitude assumes a growing importance.
[Page 623]I have discussed with Attolico47 the recent indications of Italy’s attitude and as we analyzed the letter to Lord Runciman the speech on Sunday and previous communications it would appear that the position is as follows:
Mussolini desires above all to avoid a European struggle; if there must be a struggle between Czechoslovakia and Germany he desires it to be limited If this appears impossible and a general war results then in his words, “Italy’s place is chosen.”
The two recent announcements seem to show: (a) Mussolini serves warning on the Czechoslovak Government that the Sudeten-German problem must be settled in the interest of European peace, (b) He serves warning on Germany and holds out hope to the Czechs by declaring his peaceful interest in and friendship for an “independent Bohemian state”, (c) He foresees the possibility of a repetition of the same sort of danger arising in the future in respect to the Hungarian and Polish minorities and therefore desires once and for all by one more operation to eliminate future danger spots in the Danube valley.
France. He waves a red flag at France in declaring that if the war is generalized Italy’s place is chosen and this is published on the day on which the French Cabinet is discussing Chamberlain’s proposal.
Attolico says that the Italians are under the impression of recent events:
A month ago the British discouraged their traders from dealing with Italy.
Two weeks ago the French refused visas to travelers to Italy.
Then came Chamberlain’s statement of a week ago Saturday to the effect that England in any case sides with France. This was made more specific by Eden’s letter to the Times. In Italian eyes the guarantee that Great Britain had given, as a remnant of the Locarno undertakings, has changed into an out and out alliance with France. Italy is logically driven to take definite position in the opposing camp since to remain here if Germany were destroyed it would be Italy’s turn next.
The Ambassador urgently hopes that if this present crisis is surmounted it will be followed immediately by a realization of the Four Power Pact. Without it he can see no hope for the maintenance of peace in Europe or for the avoidance of automatic and binding alliances dividing Europe into two camps. The Four Power Pact he continues would fill the purpose originally conceived for the Council of the League of Nations by enabling the great Western Powers in a moment of danger automatically to consult.
[Page 624]It is curious that in another conversation today with Lipsky, Polish Ambassador, I found him also speculating along these same lines in respect to the Italian attitude.
He says that he is so convinced that warnings and threats to Germany are worse than useless, that he has consistently maintained the attitude in his conversations with Germans that the German Government will be driven by logic and reason to a peaceful settlement rather than one which will risk a European conflict.
Lipsky feels that the Germans consider the Chamberlain visit as a triumph for Hitler. They welcome the step with its possibility of appeasement but nevertheless they have made no public rejoicing over the triumph and indeed have shown by their courtesy and warmth of reception their appreciation of Chamberlain’s attitude. Lipsky states further that in his opinion Chamberlain’s visit has gone far towards soothing the wounded pride occasioned by the British warning on May 21 with its disastrous result in spurring German military preparation and stiffening their attitude.
- Bernardo Attolico, Italian Ambassador in Germany.↩