760F.62/908: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 19—1:15 p.m.]
966. My 963, September 19, 1 a.m.40 Cambon has just shown Johnson41 in strict confidence the text decided upon between the British and the French of a note to be delivered to Beneš as soon as the respective Governments of the two countries have given their approval.
The text of this note has already been sent to the British and French Ministers in Praha for immediate delivery upon receipt of the necessary authorization.
Cambon said that this note contained in essence the entire results of yesterday’s discussions. He also said quite frankly that he was sick at the result; that it was the most painful possible experience for his Government which since the war had met with nothing but complete sincerity and loyalty from Czechoslovakia. He said also that he himself felt strongly that the effect of this decision when known would be [deplorable?] and diminish the prestige of Great Britain and France in all the other democratic countries of the world, not to speak of its disastrous effect on the small countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, which have serious minority problems.
The substance of the draft communication to Beneš is as follows:42
- 1.
- The British and French Governments declare that they are convinced after recent events that the situation has now reached the point where the maintenance of the German districts within the present boundaries of Czechoslovakia is in fact no longer possible without imperiling the interests of Czechoslovakia and European peace. Great Britain and France are, therefore, constrained to the conclusion that the maintenance of peace and of the vital interests of Czecho-Slovakia [Page 619] can only be assured effectively if these German districts are now transferred to Germany.
- 2.
- The two Governments point out that there are two possible methods of effecting the change: first, by a plebiscite; second, by a simple transfer. In their opinion the first presents obvious difficulties, the greatest of which would be its repercussions in other countries where minority problems are acute. They, therefore, suggest to Beneš that Czechoslovakia would probably prefer to effect a direct transfer.
- 3.
- They then go on to suggest that this transfer would obviously affect those districts containing more than 50 percent of Germans in their population. They suggest that the transfer of the territories and the limiting of the new frontier should be carried out through negotiations by an international commission on which Czechoslovakia would be represented.
- 4.
- They suggested that the international commission also be charged with the duty of drawing up a plan for the exchange of populations where those populations may desire to be transferred on a basis of option within a fixed time limit.
- 5.
- They suggest to Beneš that if Czechoslovakia accepts these proposals it is only natural that she will expect some form of guarantee of the new Czechoslovak State from the countries which have brought her to this decision.
- 6.
- The note here states that the Government of the United Kingdom is therefore prepared to take its part in an international guarantee of the neutrality of the frontiers of the new Czechoslovak State, together with reciprocal military pledges and suggested that this new international guarantee might eventually take the place of certain present existing treaties (Cambon remarked that the provisions of this paragraph were not very precise and said that the obligations of the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty would be unimpaired under the new arrangement).
- 7.
- The two Governments paid a tribute to the great sacrifice which they realize Czechoslovakia is being called upon to make in the interests of European peace and do not minimize the extent of this sacrifice.
- 8.
- They point out that the British Prime Minister expects to see Hitler by Wednesday at the latest and earlier if possible and urge upon Beneš the necessity for a prompt reply.
Cambon, who personally seemed extremely upset by the decisions framed in this note, said that he does not see how it would be possible for Beneš to give an immediate reply as he has no authority without the consent of his Parliament to accept any such terms.
Cambon pointed out the obvious fact that this note has not been delivered to Beneš and emphasized that the main portion was given in the most strict confidence.
I am seeing the Prime Minister at 4 o’clock.