760F.62/903: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:30 p.m.]
1503. General European war appears to be closer this morning than at any previous time.
The French Ministers reached Paris from London half an hour ago. They went direct to the Elysée for a Council of State. I have talked, however, with Jules Henry38 who was with Bonnet throughout the London conversations.
The Department has unquestionably been informed fully by our Embassy in London in regard to Chamberlain’s conversation with Hitler and the decisions of the British Government.
Briefly I gathered from Henry that Hitler stated to Chamberlain that he would incorporate the Sudeten within the Reich peacefully if possible, by war if necessary. Chamberlain asked if he could be assured that Hitler had no further designs on Czechoslovakia than the detachment from the Czechoslovak State of the Sudeten. Hitler promised Chamberlain that he did not wish anything but the Sudeten regions. He said furthermore that he had no intention at the present time of taking up the question of Germans in Poland or Memel or other areas in Europe. Hitler refused, however, to go into any general discussion of the organization of European peace or the limitation of armaments. He was at times intensely excited and at times calm.
[Page 616]When Chamberlain pointed out to him that France was bound by treaty to Czechoslovakia and that if German troops should cross the Czechoslovak border the French would at once attack Germany and that England would not be able to stand aside from the ensuing conflict, Hitler replied that he was a young man of 49 years and that he would live under these circumstances to see the triumph of Germany and a reorganization of peace in Europe.
Chamberlain asked Hitler for assurances in case he should undertake to attempt to persuade the Czechoslovak Government to relinquish the Sudeten to Germany that during the period of negotiations Hitler would not march troops across the Czechoslovak border. Hitler said that he could make him this promise subject to the proviso that great disorders or a revolution in the Sudeten region should not compel him to act.
Chamberlain therefore left Berchtesgaden on the understanding that he would submit to his own Cabinet and to the French Government the proposal that the Czechoslovak Government should be asked to relinquish the Sudeten region to Germany. The British Cabinet approved this proposal and last night Bonnet and Daladier approved it. The French were definitely of the opinion that a plebiscite could not and should not be organized. It was also decided that Great Britain would participate with France and other countries in a guarantee of the Czechoslovak State which would remain after the amputation of the Sudeten.
Daladier and Bonnet at the Elysée are now engaged in acquainting their fellow members of the Cabinet with the results of their conversations in London and the British are engaged in attempting to persuade the Czechs to relinquish the Sudeten voluntarily.
The situation which will arise if the Czech Government should refuse to permit the Sudeten to enter the German Reich will be desperate. As Chautemps said to me this morning just before the Council of State began the Czechs unquestionably would be better off without the Sudeten and with the general guarantee participated in by Great Britain; but for a sovereign state to relinquish any portion of its territory under threats is extraordinarily difficult.
If the Czechs should refuse the British proposals and the German Army then should cross the Czech frontier after a declaration by Great Britain that Great Britain would stand aside the position of France would become one of agonizing tragedy. If France should refuse to attack Germany the people of France would be compelled to witness the spectacle of the destruction inch by inch of Czechoslovakia by the German Army and this horrible slaughter would continue for at least 3 weeks. The French people would become so aroused that there would be strikes and revolutionary demonstrations and in the end public opinion might decide for war.
[Page 617]Chautemps went on to say that on the other hand it was clear that France would be alone in bearing the burden of both German and Italian attack. Even though Great Britain should be compelled to enter the war the British forces could be of real assistance only at sea. The British could put only 65,000 men on the continent of Europe at the moment and their air force would barely be adequate to defend Great Britain. The Russian Army could not enter into active war against Germany because it would be necessary to cross the territory of either Poland or Rumania which would result in immediate war with both Poland and Rumania. The superiority of the German and Italian Air Forces was so absolute over the French Air Force that every city in France and every military objective could be destroyed at will. Even with the full productive capacity of the airplane factories of the United States operating at full speed it would be 2 years before parity in the air could be achieved. For France, therefore, the stake was the entire youth of the country and every building in it. In the end there would be nothing left of any construction on the continent of Europe and small vestige of any race.
If the Czechoslovak Government should refuse to give up the Sudeten and Hitler should enter Czechoslovakia, France therefore will confront the appalling decision either of sacrificing the greater part of the race or of suffering a moral wound almost too great to bear. It is idle to speculate at this moment on the decision which will be determined by many small factors but there is still in France so much of the spirit of the Jacobins and behind that Jeanne d’Arc that I feel the French would march into the furnace.
Daladier, Bonnet and Chautemps have all spoken to me with regard to despatches purporting to give the opinions of officials of the American Government and of the American people, all of which indicate that we desire France to go to war at this time. They have been intensely disturbed by these expressions of opinion—for example by the despatch which appeared in Le Temps of September 17, discussing the point of view of the Department of State and indicating that “an authorized personality declared: ‘if we admit the right of peoples to dispose of themselves, there is another right which is that of a constituted Government to maintain its national unity’”; and the statement by Senator Pittman39 reported in this morning’s press “Czechoslovakia has the right to expect and demand protection from the governments responsible for its creation which pledged it their protection.”
I believe that all members of our Government and officials of the different Departments should refrain from any expression of opinion whatsoever tending to make it appear that we believe that France should go to war in order to keep 3,200,000 Sudetens under the rule [Page 618] of 7,000,000 Czechs. It is entirely honorable to urge another nation to go to war if one is prepared to go to war at once on the side of that nation but I know nothing more dishonorable than to urge another nation to go to war if one is determined not to go to war on the side of that nation, and I believe that the people of the United States are determined not to go to war against Germany.