760F.62/891: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Kennedy ) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 17—8:30 p.m.]
960. My 950, September 17, 1 p.m., and 958, September 17, 6 p.m.36 I have just left the Prime Minister. He confirmed all of the story sent you in my telegram this morning reporting my conversation with Cadogan. He said he was thoroughly convinced that Hitler had [Page 610] intended to march within 72 hours after he arrived; that the stories of tragedies happening to the Sudetens are being fed to him and Chamberlain was amazed that a man in such a responsible position could be influenced by such ridiculous tales. After the preliminaries had been gone through he and Hitler and the interpreter went off to Hitler’s room. Hitler made a remark that seemed to throw a different light on his character to the effect that when he had received the Prime Minister’s request to come and visit him, he really felt that he should go to the Prime Minister; that he did not think it fair to bring an old man down to visit him. With the exception of that one remark, however, Chamberlain came away with an intense dislike for him. He said he is cruel, overbearing, has a hard look and thoroughly convinced Chamberlain that he would be completely ruthless in any of his aims and methods. When the conversation started Hitler told him that if the principle of self-determination, which Hitler said by the way he did not create, was not agreeable to the British, then there was no sense in talking. Chamberlain asked him then if that meant that he would attempt to get the results he wanted by using force and Hitler said, “Absolutely, and I will chance a world war if necessary”. Chamberlain said, “If that is the case why did you bother to have me come here because if that is all there is to it, the conversation had better stop at once”. Hitler eased up a little at that and they started the discussion.
Hitler said he will not stand for any delay in the principle of self-determination and for that reason Chamberlain decided to come home at once to confer with his colleagues because he told Hitler he could not make that declaration there. He asked Hitler if the Sudeten region came under the Reich what assurances had they that the rest of Czechoslovakia would not sooner or later fall into his hands. Hitler said he had no interest in the rest of Czechoslovakia at all; in fact he had no further interest in the acquiring of any lands in Europe; that he had taken back 7 million Austrians and now he wanted 3 million Sudetens. Chamberlain said of course you have to take Hitler’s word for that. Hitler kept referring to the fact that he did not want the dagger in his side.
Chamberlain said to Hitler, “I will go back to England and talk with my colleagues. What assurance have I that you will not give the order to march?” Hitler said, “I will not give any military orders unless some terrific incident happens in the Sudeten area.” Chamberlain thinks he will probably adhere to that.
Hitler suggested to Chamberlain that England use its influence to have the Czechoslovak police disbanded as they were causing great trouble. Chamberlain said Runciman confirmed that today to him.
[Page 611]With reference to today’s happenings, Chamberlain reported this conversation to his Cabinet and asked them for authority to accept the principle of self-determination and after quite some discussion with [them?] I judge he was finally given authority by his colleagues to tell Hitler that Britain will accept the principle of self-determination but that he wants a chance to discuss what the method is to be. He has also been authorized to talk with Daladier and Bonnet who arrive tomorrow morning at 9 o’clock.
It becomes more and more apparent as I talked with Chamberlain that his confidence in the French becomes less and less. He received a report which Sir Samuel Hoare confirmed to me tonight that the French aviation situation is so bad that it is appalling. The French do not want to fight and they will probably blame whole thing on the British. Chamberlain said that the public will probably not believe that any more than it did the report that Daladier had advised him to go to Hitler. Chamberlain said Daladier did not know anything about it until 5 hours after the American Ambassador had been told.
I asked him what he thought the Czechs would do. He said “talk big but probably accede”; he said he expects however that if they agree they will ask England for a guarantee of protection for the maintenance of the balance of the state and Chamberlain said, “Of course I do not expect to give this but I may not be averse to it on condition the Russians are unwilling to make any commitment except to urge England to fight and if there is a disagreement to refer it to the League of Nations.[”] Chamberlain said that would not be very effective with the Germans occupying the Sudeten area. Chamberlain said he talked with the Labor group and I have talked tonight with Dalton, Herbert Morrison and Citrine, all of whom I have seen, and I judge that since they have been talking about cooperation of Russia, France, and England the Prime Minister has rather put them in the box, as he expressed it, and in their conversations with me they made it very clear that they were going along with Chamberlain.
When I saw Sir Samuel Hoare he had just finished seeing the editor of the Daily Herald and Sir Walter Layton the editor of the News Chronicle and he was trying to persuade them to have the papers strong on the side of peace. I judge he had been spending the last 2½ hours seeing all of the newspaper men to urge peace. He felt that the Herald would play ball. He hoped that Layton would but was not quite sure yet.
The Prime Minister contemplates suggesting, if he meets an agreement with Hitler on the principle of self determination, orderly elections and protection of peace and order while the plans are being worked out. On the subject of protection he asked me if all the countries [Page 612] join in whether the United States would—not a question to be discussed now but something that might be put up later—and I am sending it on to you so that you might be giving it some thought.
He told me also that he said to Hitler that the Czechoslovak thing is merely an incident and what is Germany going to do on all of these problems. Hitler said he was too occupied and worried about the Czechoslovak problem to think about anything else but Chamberlain said that before he left he had an intimation from Hitler that if this problem were settled quickly he would discuss the other matters.
Chamberlain believes that the public here will be with him if the problem is put up in the right way and he works it out decently with the French, the Czechs, and Hitler; otherwise he does not know but he says he has to take the responsibility and believes in his own aim and he is going to battle for that.
I asked Sir Samuel Hoare whether there was any probability of calling Parliament and he said not at least until Chamberlain had another talk and that he hoped not until they got these problems out of the way.
Chamberlain confirmed the general impression which has been widespread in official circles here that Ribbentrop has an extremely bad influence on Hitler.
- Latter telegram not printed.↩