760F.62/896: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 17—4:25 p.m.]
453. In respect to the Berchtesgaden meeting the Foreign Office is taking the position that nothing can be said until the second meeting scheduled for next week. At the same time they are intimating that the brevity of the communiqué issued by Hitler and Chamberlain is not to be interpreted as an unhopeful sign.
Weizsacker returned from Berchtesgaden last night and lunched with me today. He said that as soon as the more than 2 hours talk between Chamberlain and Hitler was finished Hitler came into the room where he and Von Ribbentrop were seated and recounted the conversation to them. Weizsacker added he was therefore in a position to give me an exact account of the facts.
Weizsacker said he could best summarize the situation as follows: Chamberlain has returned to England leaving the understanding with Hitler that Chamberlain is in personal agreement with the idea of a cession of territory in the Sudeten area, in other words with a [practical?] solution. To my question as to whether method had been agreed upon Weizsacker replied that neither plebiscite, direct cession or other method had been explored, that the entire phase of method was open.
[Page 609]Chamberlain made it very clear that no commitment could be made prior to consultation with his colleagues in the Cabinet and Daladier. Discussions with these gentlemen would be at once undertaken. Early next week, Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday, Chamberlain would meet Hitler again at Godesberg near Bonn for a further conference.
In the course of his discussion of the matter with his advisers Hitler suggested that he proceed to England to see Chamberlain next week instead of the latter coming to Godesberg. He was dissuaded from this position by his advisers.
Chamberlain seems to have created a favorable impression on Hitler. The latter spoke of him as “a man with whom you can deal”.
That the apprehension of premature publicity was present in Chamberlain’s mind and the memory of the34 the forthcoming explosion seems to be [evident?] from the fact that Weizsacker reports that Hitler’s first words to Von Ribbentrop and himself afterwards were, “Who is Madame Genevieve Tabouis?”35
Weizsacker added that it seemed reasonable to believe that Chamberlain would not have gone as far as he did had he not been fairly sure that he would gain the adhesion of the Cabinet and of the French. Other advices from Paris lead him to hope that the French would acquiesce.
We speculated as to how the Czechs themselves would answer any suggestion of cession of territory and Weizsacker felt that if a default were made by the Great Powers in concert and thereby termination [apparent omission] outside assistance were eliminated that the Czechs would hardly resist.
I have no means of knowing how far Von Weizsacker was authorized to tell me what he did. I therefore earnestly request that this information be kept scrupulously confidential.
I have not repeated to Paris and London. You will judge whether it is wise to repeat certain portions of it.