760F.62/897: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:50 p.m.]
456. I just had a long talk with Henderson who is more moved than I have ever seen him waiting in visible impatience the decision in the Cabinet in London and the results of the talks with Daladier. Chamberlain did not give Henderson a real glimpse of what was in the former’s mind, contenting himself with presenting a résumé of the conversation with Hitler. Henderson is extremely apprehensive of any procrastination. Indeed he said he was in despair over the fact that for 4 months he had preached urgency, that nobody at home had listened to him and he felt himself a “voice in the wilderness”.
He did not attempt any more than did Weizsaecker to give me a detailed account of the conversation at Berchtesgaden. Nevertheless the impression I got of the situation checks with what Weizsaecker told me and even the same phrase “cession of territory” was used. Henderson explained that this was the phrase the Prime Minister had employed and that it probably was synonymous in his mind with self-determination.
[Page 613]Henderson brought out the telegrams he has sent his Government in the past 48 hours. The main points he made are as follows: The Prime Minister’s coming headed off military action. Hitler has promised Chamberlain, and will keep his word barring catastrophic events in Czechoslovakia, that he will make no military move until the next meeting can be held with Chamberlain. Henderson has reported vigorously that if the Western Powers declined to adopt right of self-determination or even adopt it with a lot of conditions there will be no use talking to Hitler again. Indeed, the latter will march and a general European war will be the result. If, on the other hand, France and Great Britain are willing to adopt unconditionally “self-determination” they should be able in their conversations with Hitler to win certain concessions as to the method of putting this into effect. A further essential point Henderson has urged is that immediate pressure be put on Beneš to accept the idea of self-determination. There is of course the grave risk that Beneš will refuse or that if he accepts a revolution will break out among the Czechoslovak people. In this event there will be German intervention and a local war.
Henderson argues and has so reported that if it must come to war the choice lies between a general war on a bad cause involving the reputation of the democratic principle of self-determination or a small war of limited scope. There is no question in his mind as to what the choice should be. As he phrases the matter France and England must choose between unconditional adoption of the principle of self-determination and fighting Germany. If they choose the first they will be faced with the necessity, repugnant as it may be, of coercing Beneš into acceptance. If the principle is accepted some form of coercion of Beneš is inevitable still—either a friendly pressure by France and Great Britain or armed pressure by Germany.
He is reporting as well a gathering of troops in the Austrian area north of Vienna. He believes though he is not sure, that certain military preparations are being made in the vicinity of Breslau (in this connection see my 451, September 15 [17], noon,37 reporting Military Attaché’s summary). Our Military Attaché has just informed me that the Chief of Staff and the Commander in Chief received the Military Attachés in east Prussia for dinner last night. Obviously therefore no incident was contemplated.
Henderson informed me that on the eve of his departure from Nuremberg he had received a telegram from his Government to remain and to notify Ribbentrop that an urgent communication was coming.
Inasmuch as he recognized the danger of a further warning, he neither notified Ribbentrop nor remained in Nuremberg and so informed [Page 614] his Government. This episode must have occurred at almost the same moment as Henderson’s statement to the Press.
Henderson saw Goering [at?] Karinhall yesterday afternoon and urged him to do what he could to see that peace was maintained whatever the provocation until Chamberlain could talk again with Hitler. Goering reassured him on this, said that Hitler’s word had been given and that barring catastrophic upheaval in Czechoslovakia no steps would be taken until further negotiations had been started. Goering said emphatically that any conditions attached to the acceptance of “self-determination” would be useless and provocative and urged Henderson so to report to his Government. Goering spoke with confidence of their state of preparation and in respect to the air said that they were stronger than Great Britain, France and Czechoslovakia put together. Henderson states that he did not bluster but his very quiet was ominous.
Goering said that he was awaiting the visits of the Polish Ambassador and the Hungarian Minister, that he was expecting both of them to talk about their minorities in Czechoslovakia and to request that these be taken care of in any settlement. Goering said that he proposed to tell them that Germany was interested in the Sudeten Germans alone and not in the fate of any of the rest of Czechoslovakia.
For reasons reported in my 453 I am not repeating this message to Paris or London. You may desire to apprise them.
- Not printed.↩