760F.62/563: Telegram (part air)
The Ambassador in Germany ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:30 p.m.]
383. Little fact and ample rumor have characterized the last few days in respect to the Czechoslovak question. The common people [Page 545] of this country are now aware of the intense activity in the Rhineland fortifications, and the calling to the colors of reserve forces for “maneuvers” and as a result popular apprehension is mounting.
The fundamental point at issue between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans seems to be the formation of provincial racial units with as much autonomy as the Swiss cantons. The Czechs are apparently willing to grant large autonomy to the communes and “bezirke”, for which perhaps “counties” is the best translation. They are not willing to grant geographical autonomy to the larger provincial unit. Such autonomy is a fundamental demand on the part of the Sudeten Germans.
Apparently both the French and British continue to advise the Czechoslovak Government to use every means at their disposal to reach a solution. In this connection the Rumanian Minister here told me most confidentially that the other members of the Little Entente had warned Beneš that he must make every effort to solve this problem. They felt that as allies they had a right to express their view that the Sudeten problem should not be allowed to lead to war. The Rumanian Minister is unaware of the exact wording of the message given Beneš but believes that the foregoing is the sense.
The German press maintains its hostile and menacing tone emphasizing every incident and distorting its meaning. This in spite of the express desire of the British that outside pressure should be abandoned in order to create a state of mind which would facilitate Runciman’s mission.
My British colleague has handed me a confidential paper prepared in the Foreign Office which discusses the possibility of a plebiscite among the Sudetens and reaches the conclusion that such a plebiscite would be impracticable, inconclusive, and might perhaps provoke that very disorder and excuse for German intervention which it is in the general interest to obviate. Henderson tells me that the British Embassy at Washington has given you a copy of this paper.87 No one who has not studied the question deeply on the spot is capable of expressing a considered opinion as to whether a plebiscite would be advantageous or not. Nevertheless the suggestion arises more and more frequently not only among foreign diplomats but among Germans that the political implications of a plebiscite are calculated to appeal to the democratic conception and might reduce this particular problem to a local issue rather than to one which threatens the peace of Europe.
- Not printed.↩