760F.62/673

The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State

No. 283

Sir: The Honorable Hugh Wilson, American Ambassador to Germany, accompanied by his son and Major Arthur W. Vanaman, Assistant Military Attaché for Air, arrived in Prague by plane from Warsaw about noon on Thursday and left this afternoon by plane for Berlin. His visit here was very beneficial in a number of ways. He had an opportunity at dinner at the Legation last night to confer with a member of the Foreign Office and with the British, French and Swiss Ministers. This morning he was received by the President with whom he conferred for an hour and a quarter and then by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who conversed with him for some time. We then attended a luncheon at the British Legation given for Lord and Lady Runciman which gave Mr. Wilson an opportunity to talk with that gentleman.

In the course of Mr. Wilson’s conversation with the President, the latter explained that he had always realized the logic and the necessity of maintaining good relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. He had been the first Foreign Minister of any of the new states set up after the World War to visit Berlin. All through the meetings of the League of Nations and Locarno he had kept the question of good relations with Germany steadily in mind. Things had gone fairly smoothly until sometime after Hitler had come to the head of the German Government. Even Hitler had at first seemed to be favorable to good relations between the two countries and on three different occasions had sent him, President Beneš, personal messages in relation to the desirability of entering into a treaty with Germany similar to that between Germany and Poland.83 The last of these messages was received about a year and a half ago. The President said [Page 541] that he had responded that he would be glad to enter into such a bilateral pact but only with the knowledge of Great Britain and France. Apparently, Germany was unwilling to agree because nothing further was heard after January, 1937.

The President said he had recently had conversations with the German Minister in regard to the adjustment of relations between Germany and this country. It was agreed between them that if an agreement could be worked out with the Sudeten Germans on the basis of adequate concessions the way might be open for the adjustment of relations between the Reich and Czechoslovakia. The German Minister had expressed his thanks for the President’s attitude, but that was the 27th of July and no reply has yet been received.

Mr. Wilson inquired whether it was true that Germany had requested President Beneš to withdraw from the pact with Soviet Russia.84 The President said it was not. He said that the pact with Russia would only go into operation in the event that Czechoslovakia should be attacked and France should move to her aid. Hence if Germany had no intention of attacking Czechoslovakia, the existence of the Soviet Pact could not have any possible adverse effect upon Germany. I understood him to say that he had made this clear to Germany. Mr. Wilson, however, said that in Berlin withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from this pact was looked upon as one of the chief objectives, and it will perhaps be recalled that the German Minister stated to me last winter that Germany could not permit Czechoslovakia to be a base for Russian planes which could fly from Prague to Berlin in an hour.

The President said that he had secret information that after the National Socialist Meeting at Nuremberg, there would be a resumption of the propaganda attacks on Czechoslovakia from Berlin. He said he understood that François-Poncet was also of that opinion and that he was pessimistic in regard to the future. Mr. Wilson said that he knew François-Poncet’s views but that they were usually inclined to be pessimistic. Mr. Wilson said he himself was not inclined to believe that Germany contemplated a military attack upon Czechoslovakia, for he believed that Hitler who knows what war means and whose whole course has been to avoid bloodshed if possible, is not disposed to throw his people into another war and shed German blood. Moreover, he and the Germans know that they cannot wage a long war, and they take it for granted that France will attempt to aid Czechoslovakia and that thus Great Britain may be drawn into any conflict that may be started between Germany and Czechoslovakia and a long war result. Moreover, determined as Hitler is to better [Page 542] the condition of his people and willing as he is to operate exceedingly close to the danger line and take great risks, it is doubtful whether he would be willing to throw the German people into a war with all the disastrous consequences which such a war might be expected to have. Mr. Wilson said he had a strong belief that the work now going on in building fortifications on the French front as well as the violent propaganda over the radio and in the German press are not the forerunner of a military attack on Czechoslovakia, but are designed to upset the nerves of the British and the French in the hope that they will eventually become so exasperated that they will relinquish their interest in Czechoslovakia and let Germany do as she pleases. Mr. Wilson thought also that the work on the fortifications might be aimed at producing on the French mind such an impression of the enormous cost of fighting through those fortifications into Germany that the French General Staff would advise the Government to give up the idea of marching to the aid of this country. He explained that of course these were only opinions. One could not know what was in Hitler’s mind. The appalling fact was that the decision as to whether there should be war or peace in Europe rested with one man.

Mr. Wilson told the President that he thought he saw a slight change in the attitude of some of the members of the National Socialist Party. He then related a conversation with one party leader in which that individual had said that some of the leaders believed that the time had come when they could begin to readjust the relations of Germany to other countries and put them on a more normal basis. The revolution was over. Hitler had achieved his objective in relation to Austria; the Czechoslovakian question remained to be settled, and then they could approach the Jewish question. With these questions out of the way all other questions could be solved by negotiation. Even the colonies question could be solved by negotiation. Certainly Germany would not fight over colonies. Mr. Wilson then mentioned what he had said to the individual about the sentiment in American circles toward Germany and how if it continued to grow might even approach a warlike quality, and also how it was important that something be done to retard the growth of that sentiment and lessen the tension. He explained, however, to President Beneš that it was important not to be misled by the existing anti-German sentiment in America, especially that on the Atlantic seaboard where the Jewish controlled press had great influence. The sentiment in that region does not indicate the nature of American public opinion as a whole. He called attention to the great area west of the Allegheny mountains which has less interest in foreign affairs than the coastal region and said that the inhabitants of this area might express a certain degree of indignation towards Germany and interest in and sympathy with [Page 543] Czechoslovakia, but there was a wide difference between those expressions and a willingness to go to war in behalf or against either. He said that there was no ground for the belief that the people of the United States would support any policy of military aid to any country of Europe. President Beneš indicated that was in accord with his understanding. In fact I have never seen any indication that he had a different opinion, although he did in February [March] mention the subject when talking with Mr. Hoover85 and was told by the latter that the people of the United States were overwhelmingly against another European adventure.

The conversation then drifted to the Sudeten German question. The President said he was convinced that the majority of the Sudeten Germans do not want to go to the Reich. He later qualified this statement somewhat to show that he meant those above thirty-five years of age. He admitted that the younger Sudeten Germans were in favor of being transferred to the Reich and gave as a reason that they do not think and have nothing to lose. He stressed his belief that the great majority of the more mature Sudeten Germans wish to stay in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Wilson said that he had heard that economic conditions in the region on the German side of the boundary had been bad but that the German Government had been able to do so much for the inhabitants that their condition stood out in sharp contrast with that of the inhabitants of the Sudeten area on the Czech side of the boundary. The President said that that might be true and that the Government probably should have done much more for the inhabitants of the German area on the Czech side. Certainly it was now necessary to be liberal with parts of those areas such as Carlsbad and Marienbad where the conditions were bad.

The President then went over much of the ground covered in his conversation with me and reported in my No. 145 of July 21, 6 p.m., 1938, in relation to the provisions of the proposed legislation which is being discussed with the Sudeten Germans, He showed us on the map the area running around the Northern border of Moravia and Bohemia, the Western border of Bohemia and the Southern border of Bohemia and Moravia in which the majority of the Sudeten Germans reside and which they now wish converted into an autonomous state and pointed out that such a state would comprise a strip of territory 2600 kilometers in length and a few miles wide in which there could be no communication between the several sections of it except through the main part of Bohemia inhabited for the most part by Czechs. If the Sudeten demand were agreed to there would be left in the area in question some 600,000 Czechs who would constitute a minority and [Page 544] there would be left outside the area some 700,000 Germans who would continue to constitute a minority. He said that the Sudeten plan with respect to this area was administratively absurd and impossible.

The President then said that he had welcomed the appointment of Lord Runciman and that he hoped he would be able to bring about some amelioration of the situation between the Sudeten Germans and the Government. (In regard to Lord Runciman’s appointment, please see my No. 153 of July 28, 11 a.m., 1938).86 He made it clear, however, as he had to me at our last interview that the Government would not agree to give the German area the complete autonomy which the Sudeten leaders demand because that would be merely preparation for secession and the transfer of them and the territory to the German Reich.

Mr. Wilson and I after leaving the President called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and had a short interview in which Dr. Krofta went over some of the ground covered in our conversation with the President.

We then attended the luncheon at the British Legation given for Lord and Lady Runciman. Mr. Wilson was seated next to Lord Runciman and had an opportunity to talk at length with him. I had a short conversation with Lord Runciman after luncheon in the course of which he recalled with much apparent pleasure his visit to Washington and his conversation with the Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary Sayre. He was quite reserved in referring to the nature of his mission in Prague and while indicating in no way any optimism about being able to bring the Government and the Sudeten Germans into agreement, he said that he appreciated the great difficulties of the task he had assumed and would regard it as well worth while if even a few things could be accomplished.

Ambassador Wilson, his son and Major Vanaman departed for Berlin as already stated about four o’clock this afternoon.

Respectfully yours,

Wilbur J. Carr
  1. Nonaggression agreement, signed January 26, 1934 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxxxvii, p. 495.
  2. Mutual assistance agreement, signed May 16, 1935, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clix, p. 347.
  3. Herbert Hoover, former President of the United States, visited Prague March 4–6, 1938, during his European tour.
  4. Not printed; see telegram No. 699, July 29, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 537.