Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, General, Volume I

760F.62/262: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

London, May 14, 1938—6 p.m.
[Received May 14—5:00 p.m.]

407. 1. Following is substance of a conversation this afternoon with Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister who stated that he got his information about Henlein’s visit from Vansittart,³⁰ Winston Churchill³¹ and Harold Nicolson.³² Collating this information which he thought was remarkably uniform, he found that Henlein had told these men, and presumably others, that the demands of the Sudeten Germans could now be summarized as follows:³³

(1) Autonomy concerning municipal and county councils;

(2) A delimitation of territory, but always within the Czechoslovak State, for the purposes of outlining this sphere of local-autonomy;

(3) The Sudeten Germans are willing to accept international mediation, even that of the League of Nations, to effect a peaceable settlement;

(4) A central office (Volksrat) to look after German affairs in Czechoslovakia;

(5) They are willing to retain ordinary democratic voting procedure in the National Parliament;

(6) Foreign affairs, the judiciary, the army and national finance to rest in the hands of the central Government;

(7) The Sudeten Germans to determine how a “proper proportion” of the national budget, after allowance for the expenses of the national services to remain under central control, should be expended in the autonomous territory;

(8) The judiciary to remain neutral—that is, no party judges as in Germany;

(9) Renunciation of the Russian alliance,³⁴ but on this point Henlein told the British that his party is willing to try their hand at conversion by democratic methods through their representatives in Parliament.

Henlein explained that his Carlsbad speech was made under stress of the excitement of the German annexation of Austria, and that he and his lieutenants are now less keen about being a part of Germany, although he believed a majority of his party still favored it. However, he predicted that “a new loyalty would awaken” if the Sudeten Germans secured the concessions outlined above.

He gave the impression that he is convinced the Czechoslovaks would fight if any military putsch were attempted, even though it was backed by Germany. He said he understood this and was willing that the central Government should continue to keep its forces along the frontier just as they are now.

Masaryk’s own impressions, after his 2-hour talk with Henlein, were as follows:

Henlein was discouraged by his reception here. He was told that the British could not view any violence with unconcern, so much so that he told Masaryk that he thought the British would go to war if the Germans treated Czechoslovakia like they did Austria. Also he realizes that in the event of fighting the German territory of Czechoslovakia would be the first to suffer and would be the first battlefield.

Henlein was on the defensive during his visit here. He was under constant attack for his Carlsbad intransigence, and was told that the British did not believe he could control his own people and that they feared some overt act which would start bloodshed.

Henlein gave Masaryk the impression that he, having reflected a little after the first blush of enthusiasm following the Austrian Anschluss, has now decided that he would be much better off to be the governor of a semi-autonomous portion of Czechoslovakia than he would be as a second rate Seyss-Inquart.³⁵ He has learned by observing the progress of events in Vienna.

Masaryk is convinced that Hitler had nothing to do with this visit, and regarded it as encouraging that Henlein came here without asking permission from Berlin. Masaryk considered the “demands” as completely acceptable, except for the Russian alliance which will not be surrendered, he said, without a substantial quid pro quo.

The Minister said that he had advised his Government this afternoon to start negotiations with Henlein Monday morning, while the memory of his London visit is still fresh in his mind. He said that Praha has not yet started any talks with Berlin and that his Government still hopes to get the British to put up enough of a serious show of opposition to discourage Hitler from moving in for some time. He thinks that Hitler has enough on his hands just now to keep him occupied and that the longer an open issue with Germany is avoided the more chance there is that some solution can be found.

On his own account he finds the British officials much less firm and determined than they apparently made themselves appear to Henlein. He says he is still hearing the same vague advice that they have been pouring in his ears for the past 3 years but nothing definite enough for his Government to make up its mind what to do.

In the long run if Hitler lasts he looks for Germany and Russia to get together. In that event the Berlin Baghdad dream of pre-war days will become a reality and Western Europe will relapse to an enlarged Portugal. The British realize this, he says, but cannot make up their minds how to stop it. He says that Halifax is more in favor of a determined stand than Chamberlain and that Halifax was very discouraged by the depressing spectacle he has just witnessed at Geneva when all pretense at international decency was thrown out of the window.

2. I have the impression from Foreign Office officials that their concerted efforts with the French at Praha and their own approach at Berlin have not yet produced any really satisfying results. Uncertainty regarding the outcome, and suspicion of real German intentions is still apparent in these circles. They are groping for a way to keep the issue from coming to a head and are more apprehensive of some irresponsible acting on the part of Henlein’s supporters, thus offering Hitler an excuse for violent action, than anything else. These officials professed yesterday to have had no prior knowledge of Henlein’s visit, but the opportunity was doubtless not lost to have impressed upon him his own responsibility for keeping his followers in hand. Masaryk’s account of the advice given to Henlein has all the ring of authenticity and his own disappointment at the cautiousness of the British Government’s stand, a further indication that it has no present intention of going beyond the position stated by the Prime Minister on March 24.³⁶ See my 377, May 5, 9 p.m.³⁷

Copies to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Praha.

Kennedy

30. Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart, chief diplomatic adviser, British Foreign Office.
31. Member of Parliament, and former First Lord of the Admiralty.
32. Member of Parliament, and former Counselor of the British Embassy in Germany.
33. For British memoranda on Henlein’s conversations in London, see British Documents, 3d ser., vol. i, Appendix ii, p. 630.
34. Agreement for mutual assistance, signed May 16, 1935, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clix, p. 347.
35. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Austrian National Socialist leader, and “Lord Lieutenant” (Reichsstatthalter) after the incorporation of Austria into Germany, March 13, 1938.
36. British Documents, 3d ser., vol. i, doc. No. 114, p. 95.
37. Ante, p. 50.