740.00/387: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:40 p.m.]
773. I called this afternoon on Bonnet who has just returned from Geneva. Bonnet said that he had taken over the direction of the [Page 501] foreign affairs of France38 when there were no more cards in France’s hand. The one bright spot was that the British had expressed to him and Daladier39 in London the fullest determination to stand by France and a complete understanding of France’s difficulties.
On the other hand the British at first had said that they had no intention of doing anything to protect Czechoslovakia. They had described Czechoslovakia as a combination of rags and patches stitched together by the Versailles Treaty that no one should die to protect. Daladier and he had made the British understand, however, that France would be in honor bound to go to war if German troops should march into Czechoslovakia and that France would fulfill this obligation.
The British had agreed finally to intervene both in Berlin and in Praha—on the other hand to inform the Germans that they were certain that France would march in case Czechoslovakia should be invaded by the German Army and that England would be drawn into the war; on the other hand to press the Czechs to make concessions to the Sudeten Germans sufficient to satisfy both the Sudeten Germans and Hitler.
Bonnet said that when Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, had made these remarks to Ribbentrop, Ribbentrop had replied that Germany was glad that Great Britain was working in this sense and that Germany would not march troops into Czechoslovakia during the period of the British effort to find a solution unless Sudeten blood should flow. In that case Germany would feel obliged to protect the Germans on the Czech side of the frontier.
Bonnet said that his whole policy at the present time was based on allowing the English full latitude to work out the dispute. He felt that if it were possible to adjust this dispute without war the British could do it and efforts by France could only muddy the waters since France was allied to Czechoslovakia.
Bonnet went on to say with the greatest vehemence and emotion that he believed a French declaration of war on Germany today in order to protect Czechoslovakia would mean the defeat and dismemberment of France. The French had a good army but since in the matter of refusal of the Belgians to permit the passage of French troops a French attack on Germany would have to be confined to a frontal attack on the “Siegfried Line” between Luxemburg and Strasbourg. This meant the almost immediate death of the whole of French youth. Furthermore French aviation was in a most lamentable condition and could not hold the air against German aviation. Moreover, there were no antiaircraft guns to protect Paris and [Page 502] other vital French centers. Moreover, the total supply of gas masks to protect the civilian population was 30,000. Germany would control the air completely and would be able to destroy Paris and every French factory.
He had had recently discussions of the utmost importance with the Poles, the Rumanians and the Russians. The Poles had made it clear that they would not march with France if France should go to war with Germany to protect Czechoslovakia. They had furthermore stated categorically that if a Russian Army should attempt to cross Poland to attack Germany or to defend Czechoslovakia, Poland would at once declare war on the Soviet Union.
He had had a similar discussion with Comnene, Foreign Minister of Rumania. Comnene had stated to him equally categorically that an attempt by Russian troops to cross Rumanian territory would result in an immediate declaration of war by Rumania on the Soviet Union.
The Yugoslavs had made it clear that they would not go to war to support Czechoslovakia.
The British had stated that while they knew they would be drawn eventually into a war between France and Germany [apparent omission] enter such a war at the outset.
The result of a French declaration of war on Germany in support of Czechoslovakia would be therefore that two of France’s allies would be at war with the third and France would be fighting Germany alone—with Italy waiting to pounce.
Bonnet added that there were a number of members of the French Cabinet notably Mandel41 who believed that France should go to war with Germany now since they thought that in spite of France’s present weakness vis-à-vis Germany she would never again be relatively stronger and because they felt that the Russian Army could crush Rumania quickly and deliver a serious blow against Germany. Bonnet earnestly desires [sic] the latest reports from Coulondre, French Ambassador to Moscow, indicated that 70% of the officers of the Soviet Army on the European frontier had been shot in the recent purges and said that neither he nor the French General Staff believed that the Russian Army could take any offensive action in Europe.
On this subject he had attempted to have a thoroughgoing conversation with Litvinov42 at Geneva and had asked Litvinov pointblank what the Soviet Union would do if Germany harmed Czechoslovakia. Litvinov had replied that the Soviet Union would wait to see what France would do, and had been completely evasive when he had asked [Page 503] how the Soviet Armies could get across Poland and Rumania to attack Germany.
Bonnet said his conclusion was that if France should be provoked to going to war with Germany at the present time on a point of honor the result would be even more terrible than the result when France had gone to war in 1870 on the basis of the insult contained in the forged Ems telegram. So far as he was concerned he would fight to the limit against the involvement of France in war at the present time. He added that he was not at all sure what the attitude of the Cabinet would be and implored me to do what I could to calm those who wanted war, like Mandel and Herriot.43
Bonnet said that Osusky, Czechoslovak Minister in Paris, was to call on him this evening at 8 o’clock to indicate to him the concessions Czechoslovakia was prepared to make to the Sudeten Germans. We discussed the question of these possible concessions and Bonnet expressed the opinion that Beneš might decide to provoke war at the present time by an exceedingly clever maneuver. He might make concessions to the Sudeten Germans which would appear considerable and generous but would stop short of being satisfactory or even a satisfactory basis for discussion. If the Sudeten Germans then rejected these terms, as Beneš would expect, and should start riots, the Czechoslovak Government would put down these riots, and the ensuing bloodshed would provoke immediate German intervention and a French declaration of war. Bonnet said that he was so fearful that the concessions to the Sudeten Germans would be carefully designed to be inadequate that he would rigorously refrain from expressing to Osusky or to the Czechoslovak Government any opinion as to the concessions until he had learned from the British that these concessions would prove to be satisfactory to the Sudeten Germans and to the German Government.
In spite of the fact that Bonnet, Daladier and Chautemps all realize that the present moment is the most unfavorable one since the Armistice for France to risk war, I believe that if Czechoslovakia should make concessions and then Germany should march into Czechoslovakia and the Czechs should resist, popular pressure for France to declare war on Germany might easily become uncontrollable after a period of a week or more. The Communists would certainly be for war; the Socialists in large measure would be for war and various elements in the Center and the Right, such as those represented by Herriot and Mandel, would be for war.
As a fair example of the emotional state of France I submit the following remarks of Delbos44 who after beginning an evening with [Page 504] me, by the statement that he was utterly opposed to France going to war, ended the evening by saying that if it should come to a choice between violating France’s pledged word and risking the destruction of France and of Europe he was in favor of the latter course. “We have been defeated but we have never been contemptible. If we should abandon our honor because of fear we should be no better than any other nation.”
- On April 10, 1938.↩
- Edouard Daladier, President of the French Council of Ministers.↩
- Georges Mandel, French Minister for the Colonies.↩
- Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and representative on the Council of the League of Nations.↩
- Edouard Herriot, President of the French Chamber of Deputies.↩
- Yvon Delbos, former French Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩