Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, General, Volume I

760F.62/259: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Warsaw, May 13, 1938—10 a.m.
[Received 3:55 p.m.²⁷]

69. 1. Warsaw has now become a focal point of quandary in terms of Britain’s, France’s and Germany’s desire to ascertain Poland’s position in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. In British and French eyes, Poland might conceivably adopt any one of the following three courses:

(A) to sit tight;

(B) to grab the Polish minority in the Teschen District;

(C) to block Germany’s eastward expansion.

In my opinion Poland’s natural preference in the matter would be to “sit tight” or at least to await the turn of events before making a final decision. On the other hand a Polish grab of the Teschen District in the event of a German seizure of the Sudeten land might conceivably entail a dual purpose.

(1) to block the extension of the German frontier along the Polish southern border.

(2) to recover the valuable coal lands of Teschen which the Poles continue to feel were stolen in 1920 by the Czechs while the Poles were elsewhere occupied.²⁸

2. My observations prompt me to believe that unless definite guarantees for Poland’s security were granted both by Britain and France, Poland could not be expected for the following reasons to adopt a protective role necessary to Czechoslovakia’s position.

(A) As pointed out in my despatch No. 194, October 7, 1937 and my despatch No. 433, April 13,²⁹ one of Beck’s cardinal policies (in his direction of Poland’s affairs) might be characterized as “active neutrality”, which is attributable to his deep-lying belief (inherited from his old master Pilsudski) is the purpose and legitimacy of Poland’s pursuance of a neutralist policy as a means of saving Poland from the fate of becoming a battle ground for her bigger neighbors. In connection therewith I believe that, in anticipation of Germany’s some day attacking Czechoslovakia either in form of a military move or an “inside job”, the Polish Government has kept alive her misunderstanding with Czechoslovakia in order to build up such a record adding that if and when the time came when the League might call upon Poland to support Czechoslovakia, either by military assistance or to serve as a passageway for a Russian punitive expedition or both, Poland might point to this record of misunderstandings as a legitimate reason to refuse these requests for support. (Of pertinent interest I note that Polish official circles continue to be of the opinion that Hitler still prefers to accomplish his objective vis-à-vis Sudetens by means of an “inside job” and to so confuse the issue as not to risk Germany’s involvement in a consequent war of major proportions.)

(B) Poland’s own position vis-à-vis Germany is far from comfortable for she always faces the possibility of: (a) Germany’s turning her aggressive attention towards the Corridor and Upper Silesia; (b) German—vis-à-vis the German and Ukrainian minorities—machinations are even now afoot.

Hence I do not believe Poland could be expected to “stick out her neck” in initiating a movement entailing the protection of Czechoslovakia which might provoke the suspicion and subsequent ire of an aggressive minded and power drunk Germany unless Britain, particularly, and France would give assurances of accepting their part of the responsibility entailed in such a project and unless Britain and France would grant adequate guarantees for Poland’s security.

(Section 2.) 1. In my recent strictly confidential conversations with informed officials the following has come to light: official circles here received reports through confidential channels indicating Britain had come to accept Berlin’s insistence that settlement of the Sudeten question was a matter outside the domain of a general settlement of European grievances. This to my mind is important if true for such policy together with the impression fast gaining ground here that Britain and France would be willing to put up with almost any arrangement in respect to a settlement of the Sudeten question providing it did not drag them into a war may be expected to have an important effect not only on Polish policy but also upon the entire situation in Eastern and Central Europe.

2. Of pertinent bearing, Polish official interest is engaged by its confidential reports of this morning to the effect that Henlein’s present visit to London was engineered by Noel-Buxton, Laborite, who was a strong advocate of Sudeten’s autonomy. These reports moreover indicate that Buxton had arranged unofficial and informal meetings between Henlein and several British Cabinet officials who, according to the reports, might be expected to urge Henlein to be moderate in his demands.

3. Polish officialdom, in the absence of further news in connection with Henlein’s visit, confidentially expressed their opinion that Henlein’s visit coming as it did on the eve of the Czech Government’s publication of its program outlining a new status for minorities and on the eve of the forthcoming municipal elections might conceivably mean that Henlein possibly having gained some advance knowledge of the contents of the Czech Government’s minority proposal and having been dissatisfied with those findings had gone to London either in search of support for his position or as a grandstand play whereby he might subsequently create the impression abroad that he enjoyed support in British quarters.

4. My informants moreover felt that Hitler would welcome Henlein’s London visit for Berlin would thus be able to place some of the responsibility in connection with bringing about a peaceful settlement between the Sudetens and the Czech Government at the door of 10 Downing Street. In this connection the newly arrived German Ambassador to London imparted to Polish Ambassador Raczynski that Hitler was anxious to minimize Berlin’s hand in such a settlement. In fact, Hitler wanted the outstanding grievances to be settled strictly between Henlein and the Czech Government.

Biddle

27. Telegram in two sections.
28. See Foreign Relations, 1920, vol. i, pp. 36 ff.
29. Neither printed.