Office of the Historian

794.00/110: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, March 12, 1937—7 p.m.
[Received March 12—9:40 a.m.]

86. Embassy’s 85, March 11, 6 p.m., paragraph 11.

1.
In reply to an interpellation in the Lower House in regard to American-Japanese relations, Sato yesterday reiterated the opinion expressed to me that American-Japanese relations depend largely upon Sino-Japanese relations (Embassy’s 77, March 5, 6 p.m.). He said that if Japan’s policy toward China is fair and is one of which Japan need not be ashamed or afraid to reveal to the world, the United States will feel no anxiety concerning Sino-Japanese relations with resultant benefit to American-Japanese relations. In this connection he asserted Japan’s intention of maintaining the principle of the Open Door in Central and South China (sic).
2.
In regard to the German-Japanese agreement, Sato said that Japan had no intention of joining the Fascist camp; that the agreement therefore should not impair Japan’s relations with other nations; and that there is no possibility that Japan through the agreement will be dragged into an European war.
3.
Sino-Japanese relations. Sato said that he has no intention of including the question of Manchukuo in any future negotiations with China; also that the Japanese Government has full sympathy with the Chinese in their efforts at national unity. He denied in reply to a specific interpellation any fundamental divergence of views regarding China questions between himself and the Premier and War Minister.
4.
In regard to the suggestion in his speech of the 8th concerning the Soviets and the Comintern (paragraph 3 of Embassy’s 85, March 11, 6 p.m.), Sato said that he did not contemplate the elimination of the Comintern from Russia but only intended to indicate that the [Page 42] existence of the Comintern in Russia made necessary the German-Japanese agreement.
5.
In the concluding portion of his speech Sato said that the crisis, if by crisis is meant strained foreign relations, is not peculiar to Japan and that whether or not the crisis is to be translated into war depends entirely upon the way in which the Japanese nation thinks; if Japan does not want such a crisis it can be avoided at any time. He added that Japan if it is a great nation should walk the open path in a straightforward and dignified manner.
6.
Sato’s comments on the “crisis” contradict the statement of the Premier when, concurrently Minister for Foreign Affairs, he said that the situation in the Far East since the Manchurian incident “might explode at a touch”. Certain circles in the army (called the “middle stratum”) according to this morning’s vernacular newspapers have taken exception to Sato’s comments holding that he has not a clear conception of Japan’s domestic and foreign circumstances.
7.
Some observers in Tokyo believe that the Japanese Government with the consent of the present army leaders is abandoning the “diplomacy of desperation” and returning to the “Shidehara diplomacy”.46 Apparently, however, the radical elements of the army are opposed to any such change. It is as yet too early to attempt any prediction as to the outcome of this conflict of opinions.

Repeated by mail to Peiping.

Grew
  1. Conciliatory policy of Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, who resigned in December 1931.↩