Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

794.00/109: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, March 11, 1937—6 p.m.
[Received March 11—11:05 a.m.]

85. Department’s 44, March 10, 6 p.m.⁴⁴

1. No official English version of Sato’s speech was issued by the Foreign Office. The Embassy understood that unofficial translations of practically the entire speech had been transmitted to the United States by press correspondents. The Embassy had proposed to comment by mail.

2. The first part of the speech dealt with the advisability of continuity of diplomatic policy (paragraph 3 of Embassy’s 69, March 4, 2 p.m.) but also stated that it was necessary at times to revise foreign policies to meet changed conditions.

3. Soviet-Japanese relations. Sato admitted that conditions at present are undesirable and placed the blame for such conditions primarily upon the existence within the Soviet Union of the Comintern. He suggested that if the Soviets should refuse longer to recognize the existence of the Comintern within its territory or if the organization should be transferred outside the country Soviet relations with Japan as well as with other countries would be brighter.

4. Anglo-Japanese relations. Sato emphasized the intention of the entire Japanese nation to promote harmony between the two nations and mentioned points of friction. He intimated that the chief point of friction lay in Sino-Japanese relations (paragraph 1 of Embassy’s 77, March 5, 6 p.m.) because of British fear that their interests in China are menaced by the Japanese advance. He said that Japan does not wish to cause anxiety to Britain or other countries and that Japan should ascertain the causes of such anxiety, should consider such causes and should endeavor to respect the rights of other countries in China. He added that if Japan develops peacefully her interests in China it will win the full understanding of other countries.

5. Sino-Japanese relations. Sato admitted the present impasse which he characterized as inevitable. He stated that an ideal solution could not be found at once and that it would be necessary to start with a new point of view. He said that diplomatic negotiations are normally conducted on a basis of equality between nations and intimated that the difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations have been due to Japan’s sense of superiority over China. He proposed to give consideration to China’s demands and vital interests and to negotiate with China on a basis of equality and in a conciliatory spirit while maintaining Japanese interests intact.

6. Sato did not mention the United States in the speech, a favorable indication.

7. The speech was generally well received in Japan but only two vernacular newspapers commented on it editorially. The Asahi praised its outspoken tone and characterized it as highly creditable but criticised as impossible of achievement Sato’s suggestion that Soviet Russia separate itself from the Comintern. The Yomiuri praised Sato’s determination to break the deadlock in Japan’s foreign relations but also adversely criticised the suggestion regarding Soviet Russia. The Advertiser, Times, and Chronicle also published editorials commenting favorably on the speech.

8. The Embassy has been informed that Japanese financial and business circles warmly approve of Sato’s declaration of policy.

[9.] To the Embassy it appears that the significant points in Sato’s speech are (a) the emphasis upon the fact that improvement of relations with China will react favorably upon relations with other countries, and (b) the intimation revealed by the tone of friendliness and peaceful cooperation on the basis of equality in the speech that Sato diplomacy will assume a more conciliatory tone than previous diplomacy especially in regard to China. Observers point out, however, that the Kwantung army may upset Sato’s plans.

10. As of significance in this connection one of my colleagues has informed me that Sato told him that before returning to Japan he did not think he could accept the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs owing to the difficulty of reconciling his views with those of other members of the Cabinet, especially those of the War Minister.⁴⁵ To his surprise upon consulting with the Cabinet he found that their views and his practically coincided resulting in his acceptance of the position. This indicates a change of policy on the part of the military probably resulting from their past mistakes and failures. It has also been suggested by observers that increasing difficulties between Japan and Soviet Russia with renewed risk of eventual war has dictated the wisdom of improving Sino-Japanese relations.

11. Sato is being interpellated again in the Diet this afternoon. The Embassy will report any significant developments arising from the interpellations.

Repeated by mail to Peiping.

Grew

44. Not printed.
45. Gen. Hajime (Gen) Sugiyama.