793.94/9143: Telegram
The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 3—10 a.m.]
418. The Chinese Mayor of Shanghai called on me yesterday afternoon, saying he came privately and unofficially to discuss the existing tension here and the efforts he has been making to avoid any clash between Japanese and Chinese. Incidentally, but as the obvious purpose of his visit, he brought up the situation in 1932, when he said the Japanese had been “permitted” to use the Settlement as a base for hostile operations against the Chinese, and suggested that if this were to occur again the situation would become difficult in reference to safety of foreign residents. What he wanted undoubtedly was to sound out opinion as to the action which would be taken if the Japanese were again to use the Settlement as a base of operations. I confined myself to refuting his statement that the Japanese had been “permitted” to use the Settlement as a base in 1932, and to emphasizing the [Page 321] necessity for both sides to avoid imperiling the safety of the large foreign population of Shanghai. He was critical of the action of the Japanese in having sent their forces into Chapei on the night when the Japanese sailor Miyazaki was found missing, stressing the difficulty he had had in restraining the Peace Preservation Corps and police from resisting such intrusion which he considered a violation of the 1932 truce. In reply I suggested that it would be wise to avoid any rash action by the Peace Preservation Corps and that the mere presence of small guards of Japanese [sailors?] near Japanese premises outside the Settlement and extra-Settlement roads in an emergency should not be promptly interpreted as an invasion of Chinese territory. I urged that if any further incidents occurred at Shanghai the utmost effort be made to localize them and not permit them to enlarge and become the occasion of any serious clash imperiling the safety of both Chinese and foreign residents of the area.
- 2.
- In view of recent inquiries from prominent unofficial Chinese as to the possible neutralization of Shanghai in event of war between China and Japan, I asked the Mayor whether he knew anything of any such proposal or had given it any thought. He said that he had not thought of it.
- 3.
- My British colleague tells me that he had a similar visit from the Mayor, and that he knows that the question of the possible use by the Japanese of the International Settlement as a base of operations as in 1932 was mentioned recently to the British Ambassador by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- 4.
- The question of the possible neutralization of Shanghai is, I am aware, quietly being discussed in local foreign circles. It seems to me that while China might be persuaded to agree to such a proposal on the basis of providing a haven of refuge for foreign nationals throughout the country, it would be difficult to persuade the Japanese to such a proposal although they took such action in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95. If anything is proposed by way of suggesting the neutralization of the Shanghai area, preparations therefor should of course be made in advance so as to permit of prompt action should the sphere of the present clash be extended and a state of war impend.
- 5.
- As I see it, the neutralization of Shanghai would necessitate the establishment of a neutral zone to the extent of 5 or 10 miles beyond the Settlement and concession boundaries, the withdrawal of all Chinese and Japanese military and naval forces from such areas, the “policing’ of the area by or under the supervision of foreign troops, which would require that present forces be augmented, the withdrawal from Shanghai of all Chinese National Government offices, the impounding of customs and other Chinese revenues except municipal [Page 322] revenues, and supervisory control of the posts, telegraphs, radio and cable facilities.
- 6.
- I have discussed the foregoing telegram with the Ambassador who is here on a very brief visit. We are agreed that any proposal for neutralization would have to originate with the powers chiefly interested, namely, the British, French, Americans, and that the proposal would have to be made by those powers to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. We are without information enabling us to forecast what the reactions of China and Japan would be, but we are both of the opinion that the matter should be given some consideration as the situation here in Shanghai would become very precarious if hostilities on a general scale were to develop in China.
Repeated Tokyo. Copy handed to Ambassador. To Peiping by first courier.