793.94/9151: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 3—2:40 p.m.]
521. My 516, July 30, 7 p.m., opening paragraph39 and your 322, July 29, 2 p.m. I saw Vansittart this afternoon and he told me that his Government appreciates your message to which he wished to make the following considered reply:
The real problem would seem to be whether it is possible to frame proposals which if adopted by both sides would stop the fighting. After the clash between the Chinese and Japanese which took place on July 9, it would seem to be impossible to ask for withdrawal of Japanese troops. Some of them are scattered in small detachments and subject to danger of attack from armed Chinese bodies who are not under a central high command or control. It is perhaps true that the Japanese have used excessive force but in view of recent events at Tientsin and Tungchow it would seem more than ever impossible to ask Japan to withdraw her troops or that Japanese commanders should refrain from measures to safeguard Japanese life and property. In these circumstances Vansittart said that his Government desires to submit for consideration of the United States Government that the only proposals which can be put forward would seem to be to the effect that both sides should appoint plenipotentiaries to discuss terms for a settlement. The United States and British Governments might offer their good offices (a) in providing neutral ground where the plenipotentiaries might meet and (b) during the negotiations in [Page 320] smoothing any difficulties that might arise. If both sides agreed in principle that the matter should be settled by negotiation, then it might be urged that no more Chinese Central Government troops should be sent north and that no more Japanese troops should enter Hopei either from Japan or Manchuria; further arrangements with regard to troops would be a matter for the plenipotentiaries to discuss. The British Government thinks it desirable for it to be made clear that any proposals on these lines are not more than an offer of good offices and in no sense intervention; any appearance of intervention might inflame public opinion in Japan and have the effect of strengthening the military; it might also encourage the Chinese to believe that the United States and British Governments intend to take active measures toward restraining Japan.
His Majesty’s Government have given careful consideration to the suggestion that a proposal for evacuating Peiping should be the basis for suggesting the suspension of hostilities; it seems to the British Government, however, that the developments of the last few days have already made such a plan inapplicable to the present situation. Hostilities might continue anyhow and probably will in North China until China and Japan have agreed on some new form of administration.
If you should agree in principle with the suggestion of an offer of good offices Vansittart is strongly of the opinion that before the two Governments decide whether or not it is feasible to make such an offer they both should consult their Ambassadors in Japan for their opinions as to its probable reception by the Japanese Government.