793.94/8875: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

489. My 479, July 16, 6 p.m. At his request I saw Eden this afternoon. He told me that the situation in the Far East had taken a [Page 225] grave turn for worse and that his Government was greatly concerned over it; that he had discussed the matter with the French as he had with us, but he had not felt it desirable to bring Russia into it. In addition, he had merely sent telegrams to Berlin and Rome, although he felt neither would take any direct interest in the situation.

While he felt himself barren of ideas, he said he would welcome any suggestion from the American Government as to any action which might tend towards appeasement; that he understood and fully agreed with the Secretary of State’s position that American action and British action should be along parallel lines, and was confident that separate action by the two Governments with the same objective would have at least greater weight than any action by his Government alone.

He read to me a message he had received from the British representative in Tokyo, which stated that the Japanese Foreign Office said that neither the American nor the French Government was moving and indicating that only the British Government had taken any action. Referring to the Secretary’s statement, which he said he thought was all that could be desired, he pointed out that the British message practically to the same effect had been delivered by the British representative in Tokyo, while the Secretary’s message had been delivered to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. He thought possibly the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had not transmitted the Secretary’s statement in full. With this exception he could see no difference between the positions taken by the American Government and the British Government. He was unwilling to take any other step for his Government, without the knowledge and approval of the American Government and he expressed the hope that action along similar lines if any could be taken by both Governments.

He reiterated his inability to see what could be done to stop the Japanese, but again requested advices and suggestions from the American Government and ended by saying he would keep me immediately and constantly informed of all that his Government would do about the situation.

Bingham