793.94/8788: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 15—5:37 p.m.]
284. 1. At his own initiative Hidaka, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, called today and for more than 2 hours explained the psychological [Page 176] and political origin of the present northern crisis and its possible results. Brief résumé follows.
2. Regulations controlling Japanese troops everywhere [were issued?] for the July 7 night maneuvers. First firing positively was by the Chinese. The only ammunition carried by troops in maneuvers consists of one cartridge per soldier and these are in possession of the commanding officer. Firing began again while two Japanese officers were in Wanping and obviously was started by the Chinese because the Japanese would not willingly endanger lives of these emissaries. The whole incident was evidently not premeditated because otherwise detachments would not have gone to Tungchow and elsewhere helpless because without ammunition.
3. However, informant has urged the Chinese Government not to waste time in the origin and treaty implications of the incident because a crisis of the first magnitude in Chinese-Japanese relations is imminent. To avoid this crisis the Chinese Government must approve or at least not disapprove execution of the agreement signed July 11 and failure to execute this agreement will inevitably lead to stern military action.
4. Informant repeatedly stressed that the entire Japanese nation is now convinced that the Chinese invariably misinterpret moderation for weakness and friendship for cowardice and that moderation must be accompanied by evidence of firmness. Informant is personally convinced that Japanese military officers from the highest to the lowest are now extremely reasonable in their attitude toward China and he asserted positively that the Japanese Government has no intention to enlarge the scope of this incident either by injecting or reviving political projects like the five-province autonomy movement or expanding the geographical area involved.
5. Nevertheless the Japanese Government is unalterably determined that the Chinese local and national authorities shall show good faith with Japan by executing the plain promises made by Ho Ying Chin in 193511 including removal of hostile communistic agitation (suspected in the ranks of the 37th Division of the 29th Route Army); and under such economic cooperation in Hopei informant did not regard these points as enlarging the incident.
6. The Japanese Government does not insist that the Chinese Government recognize in principle the existence of Manchukuo and to save the Chinese Government embarrassment is willing to deal only with the Hopei authorities. The Japanese Government does, however, insist that the Chinese Government shall continue to recognize the indisputable fact of the economic interdependence between Manchuria [Page 177] and China as it has already done by permitting railway and postal communications.
7. Informant said that the patience of the Japanese Government and people is completely exhausted by continuous Chinese insults and rejection of Japanese friendship as evidenced by the accumulation of innumerable unsettled grievances and the absence of a single instance of friendly cooperation. Consequently to enforce July 11 agreement and other just and moderate expectations in Hopei the Japanese Government will, if necessary, wage war with China regardless of consequences.
- For the so-called Ho–Umetsu Agreement, see despatch No. 332, March 27, 1936, from the Ambassador in China, Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. iv, p. 89.↩