793.94/8773: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 15—1:40 a.m.]
234. 1. I do not believe that either the Japanese Government or the Japanese Army engineered the incident at Marco Polo Bridge. The question of the responsibility for this incident dwindles in importance in view of use which Japanese now apparently propose to make thereof.
2. Incident of night of July 3 [7] probably involved not more than 200 Japanese soldiers who were engaged in night maneuvers in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge which is garrisoned and patrolled by soldiers of the 29th Army. Since incident occurred Japanese forces have been slightly reinforced and perhaps number now in the neighborhood of 1000. They have remained in their positions on a line south of Peiping extending from Fengtai west of Marco Polo Bridge. There have been almost daily exchanges of shots between the Japanese on this line and Chinese soldiers. Japanese apparently intend to hold this line.
3. Chinese here with whom Embassy has contact state and appear to believe that Chinese will not accept terms which Japanese have presented, and it therefore now seems certain that Japanese must enter this area in force in order to compel acceptance or in order to eliminate from this area elements opposed to Japanese plans.
4. According to one of the principal Chinese negotiators of the first 48 hours, arrangements were several times concluded with the Japanese military advisers of the 29th Army but were ignored by those officers’ superiors in the Japanese North China garrison. This seems to be true as no adequate excuse is apparent for the Japanese attack on Wanpinghsien in the early morning of July 9. Nor is any adequate reason apparent for the return of Japanese troops to the fighting area on the afternoon of the 10th as competent foreign eye witnesses state that the 29th Army troops had prior to then retired to the west side of the Yungting River.
[Page 171]5. From this time, at least, it seemed apparent that the Japanese military were intent on achieving some important ends affecting Hopei Province.
6. During the time which it seems to observers an amicable settlement might be reached if the Japanese desired it and took proper measures to prevent fresh incidents, the Kwantung Army apparently began preparations to assist and the Japanese forces in the Fengtai area were reenforced by the North China garrison. These measures might easily be regarded by the Japanese (as such measures have been regarded by them in the past) as adequate to frighten the Chinese into signing an agreement by which they would achieve their ambitions with regard to Hopei. Certainly these measures appear to disinterested observers as unnecessary to settle amicably the Marco Polo affair.
7. The negotiator referred to above stated in private conversation this morning that he believes war is inevitable unless agreements for various kinds of economic cooperation and for “suppression of Communism” are signed. He stated that if an agreement was signed, as the Japanese allege, the Chinese signers lack authority to make the agreement effective. He is firmly convinced that the Chinese will fight rather than make such agreements which will mean Japanese control of Hopei.
Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.